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ABSTRACT
We consider the problem of regulating products with negative externalities to a third party that is
neither the buyer nor the seller, but where both the buyer and seller can take steps to mitigate the
externality. The motivating example to have in mind is the sale of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices,
many of which have historically been compromised for DDoS attacks that disrupted Internet-wide
services such as Twitter Brian Krebs (2017); Nicky Woolf (2016). Neither the buyer (i.e., consumers)
nor seller (i.e., IoT manufacturers) was known to suffer from the attack, but both have the power to
expend effort to secure their devices. We consider a regulator who regulates payments (via fines if
the device is compromised, or market prices directly), or the product directly via mandatory security
requirements.
Both regulations come at a cost—implementing security requirements increases production costs,
and the existence of fines decreases consumers’ values—thereby reducing the seller’s profits. The
focus of this paper is to understand the efficiency of various regulatory policies. That is, policy A is
more efficient than policy B if A more successfully minimizes negatives externalities, while both A
and B reduce seller’s profits equally.
We develop a simple model to capture the impact of regulatory policies on a buyer’s behavior. In
this model, we show that for homogeneous markets—where the buyer’s ability to follow security
practices is always high or always low—the optimal (externality-minimizing for a given profit
constraint) regulatory policy need regulate only payments or production. In arbitrary markets, by
contrast, we show that while the optimal policy may require regulating both aspects, there is always
an approximately optimal policy which regulates just one.
Keywords Mechanism Design and Approximation, Auction Design, Negative Externalities, Tragedy of the Commons,
Policy and Regulation.
1 Introduction
The Tragedy of the Commons is a well-documented phenomenon where agents act in their own personal interests, but
their collective action brings detriments to the common good Hardin (1968). One motivating example that we will keep
referencing in the paper is the sale of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, such as Internet-connected cameras, light bulbs,
and refrigerators. Recent years have seen a proliferation of these “smart-home” devices, many of which are known
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to contain security vulnerabilities that have been exploited to launch high-profile attacks and disrupt Internet-wide
services such as Twitter and Reddit Brian Krebs (2017); Nicky Woolf (2016). Both the owners and manufacturers of
IoT devices have the ability to protect the common good (i.e., Internet-wide service for all users) from being attacked
by securing their devices, but have little incentive to do so. For the manufacturers, implementing security features, such
as using encryption or having no default passwords, introduces extra engineering cost August et al. (2016). Similarly,
security practices, such as regularly updating the firmware or using complex and difficult-to-remember passwords, can
be a costly endeavor for the consumers Choi et al. (2010); Redmiles et al. (2018). The results of their actions cause a
negative externality, where Internet service is disrupted for other users.
One way to reduce the negative externality is regulation. In the context of IoT sales, a regulator can, for instance, set
minimum security standards for the manufacturers or impose fines on owners of hacked IoT devices that engage in
attacks. Fines could come in a few forms: direct levies on the consumer, or indirect monetary incentives. For instance,
ISPs could offer discounts to users whose networks have not displayed any signs of malicious activities. One might
argue that such penalty-based policies could be too futuristic, but it is worth noting that similar practices are being
adopted in other industries to mitigate negative externalities Baumol (1972). One example is the levying of fines on
users (such as cars and factories) that cause pollution Fullerton (1997). While there are a lot of practicalities that have to
be kept in mind and the decision of when to implement consumer/user fines depends on various factors, this is certainly
one of the various policy alternatives that is worthwhile to study. Such regulations, however, can potentially increase the
cost of production, discourage consumers from purchasing IoT devices, and reduce the manufacturer’s profit. Our focus
is to compare the efficiency of various regulatory policies: for two policies which equally hurt the seller’s profits, which
one better mitigates externalities? We will also be interested in understanding the optimal policy: the minimum security
standards for the manufactures and fines on owners that together best mitigate externalities subject to a minimum
seller’s profit.
We first develop a model that consists of a buyer (e.g., consumers interested in purchasing IoT devices) and a single
product for sale (e.g., IoT device). The product may come with some (costly to increase) level of security, c, and a
consumer purchasing the device may choose to spend additional effort h to further secure the device. We consider
a mechanism for regulating the market through incentives, for example, by requiring that the product being sold
implement security features that cost the seller c dollars, imposing a fine of y dollars on the buyer if the product is later
compromised and used in attacks, or both. Which intervention is more appropriate depends on how efficient buyers
are in securing the product. The goal of the regulator is to minimize the negative externalities subject to a cap on the
negative impact on the seller’s profits—the idea being that any policy which too negatively impacts the seller could be
unimplementable due to industry backlash.
Understanding the effects of such regulations on the behavior of a single consumer is relatively straightforward. For
example: as fines go up, consumers adjust (upwards) the optimal level of effort to expend, lowering their total value for
the item. Yet, reasoning about how an entire market of consumers will respond to changes, and how these responses
impact seller profits becomes more complex.
Our contributions are as follows: (i) We model the sale of a single item with negative externalities, using the sale of IoT
devices as the motivating example (Section 3). (ii) We show in Sections 5 and 6 that when the population of consumers
is homogeneous (i.e., all consumers are comparably effective at translating effort into security) that optimal policies
need only to regulate either the product (via minimum security standards) or the payments (via fines). (iii) We provide
an example of non-homogeneous markets where the optimal policy regulates both product and payments, but prove that
in all markets, it is always approximately optimal to regulate only one (Sections 7.1 and 7.2). The technical sections
additionally contain numerous examples witnessing the subtleties in reasoning about these problems, and that any
assumptions made in our theorem statements are necessary.
2 Related Work
Auction Design with Externalities There is ample prior work studying auction design with network externalities
in the following sense: if the item for sale is a phone, then one consumer’s value for the phone increases when
another consumer purchases a phone as well (which is a positive externality, because they can talk to more people).
Similarly, the item could be advertising space, in which case one consumer’s value for advertising space could decrease
as other consumers receive space (which is a negative externality, as now each unit of space is less likely to grab
attention) Haghpanah et al. (2013); Jehiel et al. (1996); Mirrokni et al. (2012); Candogan et al. (2012); Bhattacharya
et al. (2011); Hartline et al. (2008). Our work differs in that it is a third party, who is neither selling nor purchasing an
item, who suffers the externalities.
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Improving the Commons There is also a large body of work studying the regulation of common goods (e.g., clean
air, security, spectrum access) in the form of taxes or licenses. For example, a government agency can regulate the
emission of pollution by auctioning licenses (perhaps towards minimizing the total social cost—regulation cost plus
negative externalities) Montero (2008); Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2016); Seabright (1993); Lehr and Crowcroft
(2005); Feldman et al. (2013); Weitzman (1974). Our work differs in that our regulations are constrained to guarantee
minimum profit to the seller, rather than focusing exclusively on the social good.
Approximation in Auction Design Owing to the inherent complexity of optimal auctions for most settings of interest,
it is now commonplace in the Economics and Computation community to design simple but approximately auctions.
Our work too follows this paradigm. We refer the reader to previous work Hartline (2013) for an overview of this
literature.
Mitigating Security Problems Computer security is a particular example of the Tragedy of the Commons, where
a software or hardware provider sells an insecure product, and where consumers may purchase the product without
considering or taking actions to reduce the security risks. In addition, users might be unable to distinguish insecure
products from insecure ones Akerlof (1978). One mitigation strategy is to have the vendor release updates with security
features, although this could be a costly process, as August observes August et al. (2016). However, identifying the
existence of security vulnerabilities in the first place may take time for the vendors; for instance, a common software
vulnerability known as buffer overflow remained in more than 800 open-source products for a median period of two
years before the vendors fixed the problems, according to a study by Li Li and Paxson (2017).
An alternative to relying on a vendor to implement security features or releasing updates is to incentivize the users
to follow security practices. Redmiles has found that users who adopt security practices, like using two-factor
authentication, have a lower overall utility for themselves than if they adopt no security practices at all, as security
practices may introduce inconvenience Redmiles et al. (2018). Even if users were notified of security problems that
they were presumably unaware of, it took as long as two weeks for fewer than 40% of the users to take remedial actions,
according to a study Li et al. (2016). To introduce incentives, vendors could, for instance, offer discounts to users who
adopt security behaviors August et al. (2016); regulators, on the other hand, could incur fines to users whose software
or devices were hacked Kunreuther and Heal (2003), which is a part of our model in this paper.
3 Model
In this section, we introduce our model, which consists of a population of rational buyers and a single item for sale.
After introducing each of the concepts one-by-one, we include a table (Table 1) at the end of this section to remind the
reader of each of the components.
Buyer properties Buyers in our model have two parameters: (v, k) ∈ R2+. v denotes the buyer’s value for the item
(i.e., how much value does the buyer derive from the IoT device in isolation, independent of fines, etc.). k denotes the
buyer’s effectiveness in translating effort into improved security. That is, a buyer with high k can spend little effort and
greatly reduce the risk of being hacked (e.g. because they are well-versed in security measures). A buyer with low k
requires significant effort for minimal security gains. We will often use t := (v, k) to denote a buyer’s type.
Security A buyer who chooses to purchase an item will spend some level of effort h ≥ 0 securing it, which causes
disutility h to the buyer. The seller may also include some default security level c. If the buyer has effectiveness k,
we then denote the combined effort by EFFORT(k, c, h) := c+ kh. The idea is that buyers with higher effectiveness
are more effective at securing the device for the same disutility. Note that buyers with effectiveness k > 1 are more
effective than the producer, and buyers with effectiveness k < 1 are less effective. Highly effective buyers should not
necessarily be interpreted as “more skilled” than producers, but some security measures (e.g., password management)
are simply more effective for consumers than producers to implement.
We model the probability that a device is compromised as a function g(·) of EFFORT, with g(x) := e−x. This modeling
decision is clearly stylized, and meant as an approximation to practice which captures the following two important
features: (a) as effort x approaches∞, g(x)→ 0 (that is, it is possible to shrink the probability of being compromised
arbitrarily small with sufficient effort), and (b) g′′(x) ≥ 0. That is, the initial units of effort are more effective
(i.e. g′(x) is larger in absolute value) than latter ones (when g′(x) is smaller in absolute value). The idea is that
consumers/producers will take the highest “bang-for-buck” steps first (e.g., setting a password). Note that our results do
not qualitively change if, for instance, g(x) := λ1eλ2x for some constants λ1 ∈ (0, 1], λ2 > 0, but since the model is
stylized anyway we set λ1 = λ2 = 1 for simplicity of notation.
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Regulatory Policy The regulator selects a policy/strategy s = (y, c, p) ∈ ∈R3+. Here, c denotes the security standards
the producer must include which is equivalent to the production cost. y denotes the fine the consumer pays should their
device be compromised. p denotes the price of the item. Conceptually, one should think of the regulator inducing the
producer to set security standard c and price p via particular regulatory policies (e.g., requiring a minimum security
level c′, or mandating purchase of insurance). Mathematically, we will not belabor exactly how the regulator arrives at
(y, c, p). We will also be interested in “simple” policies, which regulate either y or c.
Definition 1 (Simple Policy). For a policy s = (y, c, p), we say s is a fine policy if c = 0, a cost policy if y = 0 and a
simple policy if s is either a fine policy or a cost policy.
Utilities Recall that so far our buyer has value v and efficiency k, and chooses to put in effort h. The regulator
mandates security c (which is equivalent to the production cost) on the item (which has price p) and imposes fine y for
compromised items. The probability that an item is compromised is g(EFFORT(k, c, h)) = e−c−kh. The buyer’s utility
is therefore: v − p− h− y · e−c−kh. Observe that the buyer is in control of h (but not v, p, y, c, k). So the buyer will
optimize over h ≥ 0 to minimize h+ y · e−c−kh. By taking the derivative with respect to h, we get a closed form for the
choice of effort h∗(t, s) (recalling that we denote the buyer’s type t = (v, k) and the regulator’s strategy s = (y, c, p)):
h∗(t, s) = max
(
0,
ln(yk)− c
k
)
(1)
We can now see that the probability that the buyer’s item is compromised, conditioned on expending the optimally
chosen effort is:
RISK(t, s) := min
{
e−c,
1
yk
}
. (2)
We will additionally refer to the buyer’s (security) loss as the expected fines they suffer plus the effort they spend. That
is:
`(t, s) := y · RISK(t, s) + h∗(t, s) :=
{
ln(yk)−c+1
k , yk ≥ ec
ye−c, yk < ec
(3)
It then follows that the buyer’s utility (value minus price minus expected fines) is:
u(t, s) := v − p− `(t, s) =
{
v − p− 1/k − ln(yk)−ck , yk ≥ ec
v − p− ye−c, yk < ec (4)
Population of Buyers We model the population of buyers as a distribution D over types t. Additionally, we make
the now-typical assumption in the multi-dimensional mechanism design literature (e.g. (Chawla et al., 2007; Hart and
Nisan, 2017, and follow-up work)) that the parameters v and k are drawn independently, so that D := Dv ×Dk.1 The
seller’s profits are then:
PROFD(s) := (p− c) · Pr
t←D
[u(t, s) ≥ 0] (5)
Externalities Finally, we define the externalities caused and the regulator’s objective function. Each device sold
has some probability of being compromised, and the regulator wishes to minimize the total fraction of compromised
devices.2 That is, we measure the externalities caused as:3
EXTD(s) :=
Et←D[RISK(t, s) · I(u(t, s) ≥ 0)]
Prt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0] (6)
Optimization The regulator’s objective is to propose an s = (y, c, p) that minimizes EXTD(s). Observe that, if
left unconstrained, the regulator can simply propose c→∞, resulting in 0 externalities. Such a policy is completely
unrealistic, as it would cause costs to approach∞ and destroy the industry. Similarly, taking y → ∞ would cause
consumers to have negative utility even to get the item for free (again destroying the industry). We therefore impose a
1This assumption is even more justified in our setting than usual, as it is hard to imagine correlation between the value a consumer
derives from using a smart refridgerator and their ability to secure IoT devices.
2It would be equally natural for the regulator to aim to minimize the total mass of compromised devices. Most of our results do
not rely on optimizing one objective versus the other, but we stick with one in order to unify the presentation.
3Below, I(·) denotes the indicator function, which takes value I(X) = 1 whenever event X occurs, and 0 otherwise.
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Figure 1: Seller’s optimal profits under different distributions for efficiency, k. We plot the seller’s profits on the vertical
axis and the default security c on the horizontal axis. Each curve corresponds to different fines, y. Importantly, observe
that when the fine is zero, the seller achieves greatest profits with lower default security. However, when the fine is
non-zero, the seller may actually increase their profits with default security, but the benefits (to the seller) of default
security decrease as the buyer population becomes more efficient.
minimum profit constraint for a policy to be considered feasible. Indeed, this forces the regulator to trade off profits for
externalities as effectively as possible. Therefore, our regulator is given some profit constraint R, and aims to find:
arg mins,PROFD(s)≥R{EXTD(s)}
We will only consider cases where there is some feasible s (that is, we will only consider R such that there exists a p
with R ≤ PROFD(0, 0, p). If no such p exists, then the profit constraint exceeds the optimal achievable profit without
regulation, and the problem is unsolvable).
Recap of model Table 1 recaps the parameters of our model for future reference. Note also that many parameters (e.g.
`(·, ·) are formally defined as a function of t = (v, k) and s = (y, c, p), but only depend on (e.g.) k, y, c. As such, it
will often be clearer to overload notation and write `(k, y, c), rather than defining a new t = (v, k) with a meaningless
parameter. Sometimes, though, it will be clearer to use the defined notation for a type t that was just defined. In the
interest of clarity, we will overload notation for these variables, but it will be clear from context what they refer to.
Table 1: Model Variables
Variable Text Definition Formal Definition
t = (v, k) (value, effectiveness) N/A
D := Dv ×Dk buyer population N/A
s = (y, c, p) (fine, security, price) N/A
h∗(t, s) buyer optimal effort max{0, ln(yk)−ck },(1)
RISK(t, s) compromise prob. min{e−c, 1yk}, (2)
`(t, s) buyer security loss Equation (3)
u(t, s) buyer utility v − p− `(t, s), (4)
PROFD(s) seller profits Equation (5)
EXTD(s) frac. compromised Equation (6)
Final Thoughts on Model We propose a stylized model to capture the following salient aspects of this market: (a)
neither buyer nor seller suffer externalities when the item is compromised, (b) the regulator can regulate both the product
(via c) and payments (via y, p), (c) there is a population of buyers, each with different value v and effectiveness k at
translating effort into security, and (d) the regulator must effectively trade off externalities with profits by minimizing
negative externalities, subject to a minimum profit constraintR. The goal of this model is not to capture every potentially
relevant parameter, but to isolate the salient features above.
3.1 An Intuitive Example
In this section, we provide one example to help give intuition for the interaction between the fines y, default security c,
and seller’s profits PROFD(s). In particular, Figure 1 plots the maximum achievable PROFD(s) over all s with a fixed c
5
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(the x-axis) and y (the color of the plot). In all three examples, Dv is the uniform distribution on [0, 20], and k is drawn
from either the uniform distribution on [0, 1], [0, 3], or [2, 3], respectively. Note that k ≥ 1 is the threshold when a
buyer is more efficient than the seller in mitigating externalities, so these examples cover two homogeneous populations,
where all consumers are more (respectively, less) efficient than the producer, and one heterogeneous population, where
some consumers are more efficient, and others are not.
For each possible (partial) regulation (y, c), the profit-maximizing choice of p is essentially a classic single-item
problem (e.g. Myerson (1981)), as the buyer’s “modified value” v′ is simply v − `(t, s)− c, and the seller’s profit for
setting price p is just p · Prt←D[v′ ≥ p]. Therefore, for each partial regulation (y, c), we can construct the modified
distribution and simply maximize p · Prt←D[v′ ≥ p] as above.
Observe in Figure 1, when y = 0, the seller gets greater profits with lower c. This should be intuitive, as neither the
buyer nor seller suffer when the device is compromised. When y > 0, and Dk = U([0, 1]), the seller’s profits can
increase with c. This should also be intuitive: now that the buyer suffers when the device is compromised, they prefer to
buy a secure device.
On the other hand, when the market contains only efficient buyers (k > 1 always), the buyer prefers to provide her
own security; any increased cost will always decrease the buyer’s utility. Indeed, observe that ∂`(t,s)∂c is either 0 (if
yk < ec) or 1− 1/k (otherwise). If k > 1, then this is always positive, so higher c results in (weakly) higher loss for
the consumer, and lower utility.
3.2 Example of Efficiency Distribution
In our model, we will not make any assumptions on the efficiency distribution Dk, but we provide an example of how
one could model such distributions. To construct Dk, we can isolate the different features (e.g. encryption and security
practices) that affects security of a population and how they combined affects the buyer’s effectiveness in providing
security.
Consider the case where some IoT devices, such as security cameras, allow the use of two-factor authentication, where
the first factor is password-based authentication, and the second factor is based on, for instance, SMS. A user has the
choice of using passwords alone for authentication or using the two factors. For users that use passwords alone, the
efficiency may depend on the strength of their passwords or how likely the passwords are re-used. Figure 2(a) illustrates
an example where buyers are generally more efficient than sellers if the buyers pick strong passwords.
For two-factor authentication, the efficiency may depend on the robustness of the second factor; in particular, an
SMS-based second factor might be more prone to compromise than hardware-token-based solutions, as SMS messages
could be intercepted.4 Depending on which second factor is implemented by the seller, k’s density varies, an example
of which is shown in Figure 2(b). In general, however, because the seller has the control over which second factor to
use, the seller is more efficient than the buyer. In Figure 2 (c), we use mixture distribution to model Dk when password
authentication is combined with SMS authentication. In general, systems with two factor authentication allow users
to reset passwords (1st-factor) through SMS (2nd-factor) which suggests the second factor carries higher weight than
passwords in the buyer’s efficiency. We define Pr[Dk = x] = 23Pr[D1 = x] +
1
3Pr[D2 = x] where the weights
model the fact the second 2nd factor can override the 1st factor even though SMS authentication can be vulnerable.
3.3 Preliminary Observations
We conclude with two observations which allow an easy comparison between the profits of certain policies. Intuitively,
Observation 1 claims that any policy which makes every single consumer in the population have lower loss generates
greater profits for the seller. We will make use of Observation 1 repeatedly throughout the technical sections to modify
existing policies into ones which improve profits (ideally while also improving externalities, although that is not covered
by Observation 1).
Observation 1. Let s = (y, c, p), s′ = (y′, c′, p′) be such that p′ − c′ = p − c ≥ 0 and for all k ∈ support(Dk),
`(k, s) + c ≤ `(k, s′) + c′. Then for all Dv , PROFDv×Dk(s) ≥ PROFDv×Dk(s′).
4See https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/18/16328172/sms-two-factor-authentication-hack-password-bitcoin
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(a) 1st Factor
Password Authentication Only
(b) 2nd Factor
SMS Authentication Only
(c) 1st + 2nd Factor Authentication
Figure 2: The efficiency distribution of a population. We plot the effectiveness of a buyer when restricted only to
password authentication (left) and SMS authentication (center). By combining the features, and taking into account
their contributions in minimizing externalities, we construct the efficiency distribution in the right.
Proof. Observe that for both s and s′, the seller’s profit per sale is identical (as p′ − c′ = p− c). So we just wish to
show that the probability of sale for s′ is larger than that for s. Indeed, observe that for all t:
u(t, s) = v − `(k, s)− p
= v − (`(k, s) + c) + c− p
≥ v − (`(k, s′) + c′) + c′ − p′
= v − `(k, s′)− p′ = u(t, s′).
Therefore, any consumer (v, k) who chooses to purchase the item under policy s′ will also choose to purchase under
policy s, and therefore the probability of sale is at least as large for s as s′.
Observation 2 below claims that the profit of any policy s is larger in populations D where every consumer is more
effective than in D′.
Observation 2. Let Dk stochastically dominate D′k.5 Then for all policies s = (y, c, p) with p ≥ c, and all Dv,
PROFDv×Dk(s) ≥ PROFDv×D′k(s).
Proof. As Dk stochastically dominates D′k, it is possible to couple draws (t, t
′) from (Dv ×Dk, Dv ×D′k) such that
v = v′ and k ≥ k′. Observe simply that u(t, s) ≥ u(t′, s) always. Therefore, Pr[u(t, s) ≥ 0] ≥ Pr[u(t′, s) ≥ 0], and
PROFDv×Dk(s) ≥ PROFD×D′k(s).
Observe, however, that Observation 2, perhaps counterintuitively, does not hold if we replace profits with externalities.
That is, for a fixed policy s, we might increase all consumers’ effectiveness yet also increase the externalities caused.
Intuitively, this might happen (for instance) in a fine policy which successfully only sells the item to extremely effective
consumers who effectively secure their purchase. Ineffective consumers choose not to purchase the product to avoid
fines. However, if these ineffective consumers are instead somewhat effective, they may now choose to purchase the
item, thereby increasing externalities. Below is a concrete instantiation:
Example 1. Consider the population where Dv is a point-mass at e, and Dk takes on effectiveness 0 with probability
1/2 and x > 1 with probability 1/2. Consider the policy s = (e, 0, e− 2.5). Then the (e, 0) consumer chooses not to
purchase: `(e, 0, s) = e, so their utility would be e− e− (e− 2.5) < 0. The (e, x) consumer chooses to purchase, as
their loss is 2+ln(x)x < 2 (as x > 1). So EXTDv×Dk(s) =
1
ex .
Consider now improving the effectiveness of the k = 0 consumers to k = 1 (so D′k now takes on 1 with probability
1/2 and x with probability 1/2). The (e, 1) consumer now chooses to purchase, as their loss is 2 (so their utility is
e− 2− (e− 2.5) = 1/2). So now EXTDv×D′k(s) = (1e + 1ex )/2. As x > 1, the externalities have gone up. If x ≥ 1,
the externalities may have gone up quite significantly.
5That is, it is possible to couple draws (k, k′) from (Dk, D′k) so that k ≥ k′ with probability 1. Equivalently: for all x,
Pr[k ≥ x, k ← Dk] ≥ Pr[k′ ≥ x, k′ ← D′k].
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In Example 1, of course “the right” thing to do is to also change the policy. Indeed, it is still the case that, for a fixed
consumer who purchases the item, increasing effectiveness can only decrease externalities. But without fixing whether
the consumer has purchased the item or not, the claim is false. Observation 3 captures what we can claim about risk,
loss, etc. on a per-consumer basis. Proofs for the claims in Observation 3 all follow immediately from the definitions in
Section 3.
Observation 3. Let k > k′, then for all s:
• RISK(k, s) ≤ RISK(k′, s).
• `(k, s) ≤ `(k′, s).
• h∗(k, s) ≥ h∗(k′, s).
• u(k, s) ≥ u(k′, s).
4 Roadmap of Technical Sections
Now that we have the appropriate technical language, we provide a brief roadmap of the results to come.
• In Section 5, we provide a technical warmup to get the reader familiar with how to reason about our problem.
The main result of this section is Theorem 1, which claims that the optimal policy when Dk is a point-mass is
simple. The proof of this theorem helps illustrate one key aspect of our later arguments, and will also be used
as a building block for later proofs.
• In Section 6, we prove our first main result (Theorem 2): as a function of R and Dv, there exists a cutoff T .
If Dk is supported on [0, T ], then a cost policy is optimal. If Dk is supported on [T,∞), then a fine policy
outperforms all profits-maximizing policies (we define this term in the relevant section — intuitively a policy
is profits-maximizing if the price is the seller’s best response to (y, c)). Section 6 also contains a surprising
example witnessing that the additional profits-maximizing qualification is necessary.
• In Section 7, we consider general distributions. Unsurprisingly, simple policies are no longer optimal. Perhaps
surprisingly, if one insists on exceeding the profits benchmark exactly, no simple policy can guarantee any
bounded approximation to the optimal externalities (Corollary 13). However, we also show (Theorem 3) that it
is possible to get a bicriterion approximation: if one is willing to approximately satisfy the profits constraint,
it is possible to approximately minimize externalities with a simple policy. That is, for any s,D, there is a
simple policy s′ with PROFD(s′) = Ω(1) · PROFD(s) and EXTD(s′) = O(1) · EXTD(s).
• We include complete proofs for our results on point-mass and homogeneous distributions, as these convey
many of the key ideas. By Theorem 3, the proofs get quite technical so we defer them to the appendix.
5 Warm-up: Point-Mass Effectiveness
As a warm-up, we first study the case where Dk is a point mass (that is, all buyers in the population have the same
effectiveness k). In this case, we show that a simple policy is optimal. The proof is fairly intuitive, with one catch. The
intuitive part is that every consumer will put in the same effort, conditioned on buying the item. It therefore seems
intuitive that if k < 1, it is better for all parties involved if any effort spent by the consumer is transferred to the producer
instead (and this is true). It also seems intuitive that if k > 1, it is again better for all parties involved if any effort spent
by the producer is “transferred” to the consumer instead (e.g. by raising fines so that the consumer chooses to spend the
desired level of effort). This is not quite true: the catch is that the fine required to induce the desired buyer behavior
may be too high to satisfy the profit constraint. But, the above argument does work for sufficiently large k. Importantly,
there is some cutoff T such that for all k ≤ T , the optimal policy is a cost policy (y = 0), while for all k ≥ T , the
optimal policy is a fine policy (c = 0). Below, when we write Dv × {k}, we mean the distribution which draws v from
Dv and outputs (v, k).
Theorem 1. For all Dv , R, and k, the externality-minimizing policy for Dv × {k} is a simple policy. Moreover, for all
R,Dv , there is a cutoff T such that if k ≤ T , then the optimal policy is a cost policy. If k ≥ T , then the optimal policy
is a fine policy.
Proof. Consider any policy s = (y, c, p). Because all consumers have the same effectiveness k, s induces the same loss
for all consumers. We first claim the following:
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Lemma 1. Let k ≤ 1. Then for all Dv and any policy s = (y, c, p), there is an alternative policy s′ = (0, c′, p) with
PROFDv×{k}(s
′) ≥ PROFDv×{k}(s) and EXTDv×{k}(s′) ≤ EXTDv×{k}(s).
Proof. In policy s, all consumers have the same loss `(k, s). This therefore is a good opportunity to try and make
use of Observation 1. First, consider the possibility that yk < ec. In this case, h∗(k, s) = 0, `(k, s) = ye−c,
and RISK(k, s) = e−c. This implies that EXTDv×{k}(s) = e
−c. Consider instead the policy s′ = (0, c, p). Then
`(k, s′) = 0, but RISK(k, s) = e−c and EXTDv×{k}(s) = e
−c like before. So the externalities are the same. An
application of Observation 1 concludes that the profits have improved (indeed, (c, p) are the same in both policies, and
the loss decreases as we switch from policy s to s′).
Consider now the possibility that yk ≥ ec. In this case, h∗(k, s) = ln(yk)−ck , `(k, s) = ln(yk)−c+1k , and RISK(k, s) =
1
yk . Consider instead the policy s
′ = (0, ln(yk), p− c+ ln(yk)). In this new policy, `(k, s′) = 0 and RISK(k, s′) = 1yk .
So indeed, the new policy has the same externalities. We just need to ensure that we can apply Observation 1. To this
end, observe that:
`(k, s) + c− (`(k, s′) + c′) = ln(yk)− c+ 1
k
+ c− ln(yk)
= (1/k − 1) · (ln(yk)− c) + 1/k
≥ 0.
The last line follows because k ≤ 1 and ln(yk) ≥ c (because yk ≥ ec). So the hypotheses of Observation 1 hold, and
we can apply Observation 1 to conclude that the profits improve from s to s′ as well.
Lemma 1 covers the cases when k ≤ 1: there is always an optimal cost policy. We now move to the case when k > 1.
There are two cases to consider: one where the optimal policy will be a cost policy, and one where the optimal policy
will be a fine policy. The distinguishing feature between these cases will be for a given c, how big of a fine is necessary
to incentivize the consumer to put in effort c/k, and what the consumer’s loss looks like for this choice of y. Below,
c∗ is defined to be the maximum c such that there exists a p such that PROFDv×{0}(0, c, p) ≥ R. Observe that c∗ is
also equal to the maximum ` such that there exists a p such that PROF(Dv−`)×{0}(0, 0, p) ≥ R (here, Dv − ` denotes
the distribution which samples v from Dv and then subtracts `, taking a maximum with 0 if desired). That is, c∗ is the
maximum loss that can be uniformly applied to all consumers (drawn from Dv) while still resulting in a distribution for
which profit ≥ R is achievable.
Lemma 2. Let c∗ denote the maximum c such that there exists a p such that PROFDv×{0}(0, c, p) ≥ R. Then a cost
policy is optimal for Dv × {k} if k ∈ [1, 1 + 1/c∗].
Proof. First, observe that the lemma hypothesis implies that any feasible policy must have `(k, s) + c ≤ c∗ (if not, then
an application of Observation 1 lets us contradict the lemma’s hypothesis with a feasible c′ = `(k, s) + c > c∗).
Consider now k ∈ [1, 1 + 1/c∗], and start from some policy s = (y, c, p). If this policy has h∗(k, s) = 0, then certainly
we can just update s′ = (0, c, p) and get better profits with the same externalities (by Observation 1). If instead
h∗(k, s) > 0, then `(k, s) = ln(yk)−c+1k , and RISK(k, s) =
1
yk . Consider instead s
∗ = (0, c∗, p∗), for whichever p∗
witnesses PROFD(s∗) ≥ R (we know that such a p∗ exists by the lemma’s hypothesis). So now we just need to compare
externalities. Assume for contradiction that RISK(k, s∗) > RISK(k, s). Then we get:
RISK(k, s∗) > RISK(k, s)⇒ e−c∗ > 1
yk
⇒ c∗ < ln(yk)
⇒ ln(yk)− c+ 1
k
>
c∗ − c+ 1
k
⇒ `(k, s) + c > c
∗ − c+ 1
k
+ c
⇒ `(k, s) + c > c
∗ + 1
k
⇒ `(k, s) + c > c∗ ⇒⇐ .
The last implication uses the fact that k ≤ 1 + 1/c∗. The line before this uses that k ≥ 1. The contradiction arises
because this would imply a scheme (s) with profit ≥ R with loss > c∗, contradicting the definition of c∗ by the
reasoning in the first paragraph of this proof.
9
FEBRUARY 27, 2019
Lemma 3. Let c∗ denote the maximum c such that there exists a p such that PROFDv×{0}(0, c, p) ≥ R. Then a fine
policy is optimal for Dv × {k} if k ≥ 1 + 1/c∗.
Proof. Again start from some policy s = (y, c, p), inducing some loss `(k, s). First, maybe h∗(k, s) > 0. In this
case, the risk is 1yk and the loss plus cost is
ln(yk)−c+1
k + c. In particular, observe that the partial derivative of the
loss plus cost with respect to c is 1− 1/k > 0. So the policy s′ = (y, 0, p− c) has RISK(k, s′) = RISK(k, s) but also
`(k, s′) + c′ < `(k, s) + c. So Observation 1 claims that this policy gets at least as much profits (and the risk is the
same).
If instead, h∗(k, s) = 0, then the risk is e−c and the loss is y · e−c. In this case, consider instead y∗ such that
ln(y∗k)+1
k = c
∗ and using s∗ = (y∗, 0, p∗), for the p∗ satisfying PROFD(s∗) ≥ R (again, such a p∗ must exist by
definition of c∗, and the fact that `(k, s∗) = c∗, plus Observation 1). We just need to analyze the risk. Similar to the
previous proof, assume for contradiction that RISK(k, s∗) > RISK(k, s). Then:
RISK(k, s∗) > RISK(k, s)⇒ e−c < 1
y∗k
→ c > ln(y∗k)
⇒ ln(y
∗k) + 1
k
<
c+ 1
k
⇒ c∗ < c+ 1
k
⇒ c∗ > c∗ · c+ 1
1 + c∗
⇒⇐ .
The last inequality uses the fact that k ≥ 1 + 1/c∗, and derives a contradiction as c ≤ c∗ (if c > c∗, then certainly
`(k, s) + c > c∗, contradicting the definition of c∗).
All three cases together prove Theorem 1. The T prescribed in the theorem statement is exactly 1 + 1/c∗, where c∗ is
the maximum c such that there exists a p for which PROFDv×{0}(0, c, p) ≥ R.
We conclude with one last proposition regarding the behavior of the threshold with respect to the profits constraints R.
Proposition 4 below states that as R increases, the threshold beyond which a fine policy is optimal increases as well.
Proposition 4. Let T (Dv, R) denote the threshold such that both a fine policy and cost policy are optimal for
Dv × {T (Dv, R)} subject to profits constraints R. Then T (Dv, R) is monotone increasing in R.
Proof. To see this, let c∗(Dv, R) denote the maximum c such that there exists a p such that PROFDv×{0}(0, c, p) ≥
R. Then c∗(Dv, R) is decreasing in R (as the profits constraint goes up, we can’t afford as much security). So
1 + 1/c∗(Dv, R) is increasing in R. This means that the threshold T (Dv, R) beyond which a fine policy is optimal for
Dv × {T} is increasing as a function of the profits constraint R (because T = 1 + 1/c∗(Dv, R)).
This concludes our treatment of the case where k is a point-mass. Theorem 1 should both be viewed as a warm-up to
introduce some of our core techniques, and also as a building block towards our stronger theorems (in the following
sections). The main technique we introduced is the ability to reduce risk and loss simultaneously to improve both
profits and externalities. The idea was that if the buyer is less effective than the seller, everyone prefers that the seller
put in effort (y = 0, c > 0). If the buyer is more effective than the seller, everyone prefers that the buyer put in effort.
However, the regulator can not directly mandate that the buyer put in effort, and unfortunately the fines required to
extract the desired buyer behavior may too negatively affect the profit. This is why the transition from cost to fine
policies is 1 + 1/c∗ instead of 1.
6 Homogeneous Distributions
In this section, we show that for populations that are sufficiently homogeneous in effectiveness, the optimal policy
remains simple. The second half of Theorem 2 requires a technical assumption. Specifically, we say that a policy
(y, c, p) is profits-maximizing if, conditioned on y, c, p is set to maximize the seller’s profits (that is, PROFD(y, c, p) ≥
PROFD(y, c, p′) for all p′).
Theorem 2. For all Dv , R, there exists a cutoff T such that
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• For all Dk supported on [0, T ], the externality-minimizing policy for Dv ×Dk subject to profits R is a cost
policy.
• For all Dk supported on [T,∞), the externality-minimizing policy for Dv ×Dk subject to profits R is either a
fine policy, or it is not profits-maximizing.
The proof of Theorem 2 will follow from Lemmas 4 and 6, which handle the two claims in the theorem separately.
Finally, we show in Section 6.3 that the profits-maximizing qualification in part two of Theorem 2 is necessary:
Proposition 5. There exist distributions Dv, Dk, and profits constraint R such that:
• T is such that for all k ≥ T , the externality-minimizing policy for Dv × {k} subject to profits constraints R is
a fine policy.
• Dk is supported on [T,∞).
• No fine policy is externality-minimizing policy for Dv ×Dk subject to profits constraints R.
• The externality-minimizing policy for Dv ×Dk subject to profits constraints R is not simple, and not profits-
maximizing (the latter is implied by the second bullet of Theorem 2).
Proposition 5 is perhaps surprising: a fine policy is externality-minimizing for Dv × {T}, and Dk stochastically
dominates T , so the same fine policy has even lower externalities, and potentially greater profit for Dv ×Dk. Indeed,
the optimal fine policy for Dv ×Dk achieves lower externalities than that of Dv ×{T}. The catch is that an even better
non-simple policy becomes viable, and achieves still lower externalities. Theorem 2 claims, however, that the optimal
non-simple policy must not be profits-maximizing. Even more surprising, we show in Appendix B that if we constrain
the optimization problem to only profits-maximizing prices then Proposition 5 is still true which implies the negation of
the second bullet of Theorem 2.
6.1 Extension Lemma for small k
The small k case follows roughly from the following intuition. For cost policies, neither the buyer’s loss nor her risk
depend on k. So whichever cost policy is optimal for Dv ×{T} achieves the same profits and externalities as Dv ×Dk.
Intuitively, going from {T} to Dk supported on [0, T ] cannot possibly increase the profits of any scheme (formally:
Observation 2), so the initial cost policy should remain optimal.
Lemma 4 (Extension of Cost Policy). Let s be a cost policy that is optimal for Dv × {T} subject to profits R. Then
for all Dk supported on [0, T ], s is optimal for Dv ×Dk subject to profits R.
Proof. First, we observe that PROFDv×{T}(s) = PROFDv×Dk(s). This is simply because the loss of consumers is
independent of k (as y = 0). Similarly, EXTDv×{T}(s) = EXTDv×Dk(s). This is again because the risk of consumers
is independent of k.
Now, assume for contradiction that there is some policy s′ with profits PROFDv×Dk(s
′) ≥ R and also EXTDv×Dk(s′) <
EXTDv×{T}(s). Then we have the following inequality from Observation 2:
R ≤ PROFDv×Dk(s′) ≤ PROFDv×{T}(s′).
Therefore, as s is optimal for Dv × {T} subject to profits R, we must have:
EXTDv×{T}(s
′) ≥ EXTDv×{T}(s).
This now lets us conclude the following chain of inequalities, where the first line is a corollary of Observation 3: the
consumer in a population with Dk supported on [0, T ] whose device is least likely to be compromised is a consumer
with k = T . The third line follows from the reasoning above (that s′ achieves profits at least R on Dv × {T}, and is
therefore feasible). The final line follows because the externalities of a cost policy are independent of k.
EXTDv×Dk(s
′) ≥ RISK(T, s′)
= EXTDv×{T}(s
′)
≥ EXTDv×{T}(s)
= EXTDv×Dk(s).
Lemma 4 proves the first bullet of Theorem 2.
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6.2 Extension Lemma for large k
In this section, we proof for the large k case of Theorem 2. The proof will be a little more involved this time, since
we can no longer claim that the externalities of a fine policy are independent of k (whereas this does hold for cost
policies). The intuition for this case is the same though: if a fine policy is optimal for Dv × {k} for all k ≥ T , and Dk
is supported on [T,∞), fine policies should remain optimal for Dv ×Dk. Most of the proof does not make use of the
technical assumption that the s we are competing with is a profits-maximizing policy: this assumption only arises at the
very end.
The first step in our proof is the following concept, which captures the change in loss for a consumer (v, k) for regulation
s versus s′:
Definition 2 (Policy Comparison Function). For two policies s and s′, we define the policy comparison function gs,s′(·)
so that gs,s′(k) = `(k, s)− `(k, s′).
The policy comparison function takes as input an effectiveness k, and outputs the change in loss for a consumer under
one policy versus another. Our first lemma argues that for certain pairs (s, s′), the policy comparison function is
monotone in k. That is, consumers with more effectives have greater preference for one policy over another.
Lemma 5. Let s = (y, c, p) and s′ = (y′, c′, p′) be such that ye−c ≤ y′e−c′ . Then gs,s′(·) is monotone non-decreasing.
Observe that the hypothesis holds if y ≤ y′ and c ≥ c′.
Proof of Lemma 5. There are three regions of k to consider: k ∈ [0, ec′/y′), k ∈ [ec′/y′, ec/y), and k ≥ ec/y. In the
first region the consumer has effort 0 for both policies. In the middle region, the consumer has effort 0 for one policy.
In the last region, the consumer has non-zero effort for both policies.
First consider k ≤ ec′/y′ ≤ ec/y. Then also y′k ≤ ec′ and yk ≤ ec, so the consumer’s effort is 0. In this case,
∂`(k,s)
∂k = 0 =
∂`(k,s′)
∂k , because the loss is independent of k. So gs,s′ is monotone non-decreasing in this range (in fact
it is constant).
Next, there are k such that yk < ec, y′k ≥ ec′ . Then ∂`(k,s)∂k = 0, and ∂`(k,s
′)
∂k = − ln(y
′k)−c′
k2 ≤ 0. So gs,s′ is also
monotone non-decreasing in this range (because it is equal to 0 minus a non-increasing function).
Finally, there are k such that yk ≥ ec. Then ∂`(k,s)∂k = − ln(yk)−ck2 and ∂`(k,s)∂k = − ln(y
′k)−c′
k2 . And we get:
∂`(k, s)
∂k
− ∂`(k, s)
∂k
=
ln(y′k)− c′ − ln(yk) + c
k2
=
ln(y′/y) + c− c′
k2
≥ 0.
The final inequality comes because by hypothesis: y′e−c
′ ≥ ye−c ⇒ ln(y′)− c′ ≥ ln(y)− c. So in all regions, gs,s′ is
monotone non-decreasing.
We use Lemma 5 to claim the following corollary, which essentially states that if a policy change universally lowers
loss and risk, then it is possible to adjust the price so that the profits go up and externalities go down.
Corollary 6. Let (y, c), (y′, c′) be such that (a) ye−c ≤ y′e−c′ and (b) for all k in the support of Dk, `(k, y, c) + c ≥
`(k, y′, c′) + c′ and RISK(k, y, c) ≥ RISK(k, y′, c′). Then for all p and all Dv , there exists a p′ such that:
PROFDv×Dk(y
′, c′, p′) ≥ PROFDv×Dk(y, c, p),
EXTDv×Dk(y
′, c′, p′) ≤ EXTDv×Dk(y, c, p).
Proof of Corollary 6. First, consider setting p′ := p − c + c′. Then the profits generated per sale are equal under
s = (y, c, p) and s′ = (y′, c′, p′). Observe also that the probability of sale is at least as large under s′ as s, as
we have u(t, s) = v − p + c − c − `(k, s) ≤ v − p′ + c′ − c′ − `(k, s′) = u(t, s′) for all t. Therefore we have
that PROFDv×Dk(y
′, c′, p − c + c′) ≥ PROFDv×Dk(y, c, p). But unfortunately we can’t yet say anything about the
externalities. Indeed, the problem might be that there are many additional consumers with poor effectiveness who
previously did not purchase the item under s but who now purchase it under s′ (recall Example 1). So the plan from
here is to raise the price until the probability of sale is back to its original level (clearly the profits must still be larger, as
now the probabilities of sale match, but the profit-per-sale of our new scheme is better). We’ll use Lemma 5 to claim
that the set of consumers who remain are only more secure than what we started with.
12
FEBRUARY 27, 2019
So formally, raise the price p′ until the probability of sale for s′ = (y′, c′, p′) is the same as s.6 Now we have two
schemes: s = (y, c, p) and s′ = (y′, c′, p′). Both sell the item with the same probability, q. If both schemes sold to
exactly the same q fraction of consumers, then the lemma hypothesis that RISK(k, s′) ≤ RISK(k, s) for all k would
suffice to let us claim that EXTDv×Dk(s
′) ≤ EXTDv×Dk(s). However, it could be a completely different q fraction of
consumers. Still, it turns out that because y′e−c
′ ≥ ye−c, the fraction of consumers that purchase only have larger k.
Indeed, observe that if some consumer t = (v, k) purchases under s but not s′, and some other consumer t′ = (v′, k′)
purchases under s′ but not s, then we have:
gs,s′(k) < 0 < gs,s′(k
′)
But by Lemma 5, we know that gs,s′(·) is monotone increasing, so k′ > k. In particular, this means that every consumer
in the mass which purchased under s but not s′ has lower k than any consumer which purchased under s′ but not s. As
RISK(·, s) is clearly monotone decreasing in k, and the fraction of buyers purchasing under s and s′ is the same, we
conclude that we must have EXTDv×Dk(s
′) ≤ EXTDv×Dk(s) as desired.
Now we are ready to prove the extension lemma for large k.
Lemma 6 (Extension of Fine Policy). Let Dk be supported on [T,∞), where T is such that a fine policy is optimal for
Dv × {T} subject to profits R. Then there is a fine policy s′ with PROFD(s′) ≥ R such that for all profits-maximizing
s with PROFD(s) ≥ R, EXTD(s′) ≤ EXTD(s).
Proof of Lemma 6. First, observe that we necessarily have T > 1 if the hypothesis is to hold, by Theorem 2.
Consider any proposed optimal policy s = (y, c, p). Let s∗ = (y∗, 0, p∗) denote the optimal fine policy for Dv × {T}
subject to profits R. Then maybe `(T, s) + c ≥ `(T, s∗). If so, let s′ = (y′, 0, p− c) be such that `(T, s′) = `(T, s) + c.
As T > 1, observe that decreasing c decreases `(T, s) + c. Therefore, decreasing c to 0 results in y′ ≥ y for the equality
to hold. As such, s and s′ satisfy the hypotheses of Lemma 5, and we can conclude that `(k, s′) ≤ `(k, s) + c for all
k ≥ T . We now just need to show that RISK(T, s′) ≤ RISK(T, s). This is surprisingly tricky, and carried out in the
subsequent paragraph.
Indeed, observe that (y, c) is some partial policy, and setting the price pˆ which maximizes profits yields R(y, c) :=
PROFDv×{T}(y, c, pˆ) on populationDv×{T}. Observe that as `(T, s)+c ≥ `(T, s∗), we haveR(y, c) ≤ R (otherwise
s∗ would not be optimal for Dv × {T} subject to constraint R, as we could increase y∗). We can now ask what is the
optimal policy for Dv ×{T} subject to constraint R(y, c)? By Lemma 3, we claim it must be a fine policy, and that this
fine policy is exactly (y′, 0, pˆ). To see this, we use Proposition 4, which asserts that T (Dv, R(y, c)) ≤ T (Dv, R) = T .
As T ≥ T (Dv, R(y, c)) now, we conclude that a fine policy must be optimal for Dv × {T} subject to profit constraint
R(y, c). This policy s′ must have `(T, s′) = `(T, s) + c (if it is bigger, then the profit will be < R(y, c). If it is smaller,
then the loss should be increased to get more profit). (y′, 0, pˆ) is exactly this policy. As it is optimal for Dv × {T}. We
may now conclude that RISK(T, s′) ≤ RISK(T, s). In particular, this necessarily implies that the risk is 1y′T (because
c = 0, the only other alternative would be to have risk = 1, which is clearly not ≤ e−c for c > 0). To conclude that
RISK(k, s′) ≤ RISK(k, s) for all k ≥ T , simply observe that we must now have RISK(k, s′) = 1y′k ≤ 1y′T ≤ e−c,
and also 1y′k ≤ 1yk as y′ ≥ y. So whether or not a consumer with effectiveness k has h∗(k, s) > 0, the risk 1y′k is
better. Now we can apply Lemma 5: we have come up with a new policy where everyone’s risk is (weakly) lower, and
everyone’s loss is (weakly) lower, so we can increase the price until the probability of sale is the same, and this will
(weakly) increase the profit and (weakly) decrease the risk.
So now we’ve covered the case that `(T, s) + c ≥ `(T, s∗). We just now need to consider the case that `(T, s) + c <
`(T, s∗). This is the only case where we’ll assume that the s we started with was profits-maximizing. Observe that if
`(T, s) + c < `(T, s∗), then there exists a price p′ such that (y, c, p′) generates profits strictly exceeding R. Indeed,
if `(T, s) + c < `(T, s∗), then `(k, s) + c < `(T, s∗) for all k ≥ T , so the distribution of v − `(k, s) − c strongly
stochastically dominates the distribution of v − `(T, s∗) in the following sense: for any probability q, the value vq
such that Pr[v − `(k, s) − c ≥ vq] = q exceeds wq such that Pr[v − `(T, s∗) ≥ wq] = q. As there exists a price p
such that p · Pr[v − `(T, s∗) ≥ p] ≥ R, that same probabilility of sale with a strictly increased price p′ guarantees that
Pr[v − `(k, s)− c ≥ p′] · p′ > R.
Finally, Lemma 7 (stated below) implies that every optimal policy s for Dv ×Dk subject to profits constraint R has
PROFDv×Dk(s) = R. This is because for all policy s where the profit > R, there is a ε > 0 such that we can construct
6Note that we are assuming that for any desired probability q, we can set a price that sells with probability exactly q. When either
Dv or Dk has no point masses, this is clearly true. When both have point masses, observe that if we set a price so that a positive
mass of consumers are indifferent between purchasing the item and not, we will assume that we can have some buyers purchase the
item and some not (as they are indifferent, either is a best response).
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a policy s′ with profit ≥ R but strictly less externalities. This should perhaps not be surprising, as intuitively one should
be able to decrease externalities at the cost of a little ε (although one should be careful to do this properly this for
arbitrary ε). Therefore, the optimal policy we started with achieved profitsR, while the previous paragraph observes that
there necessarily exists a price which achieves profits > R. So our original policy must not be profit-maximizing.
Definition 3 (Invariant Transformation). Given a policy s = (y, c, p), define
INV(s, α) :=
(
ye(p−c)(1−α), αc+ (1− α)p, p)
where α ∈ [0, pp−c ].
Lemma 7 (Invariant Property). Let s′ = INV(s, α), then for all k ∈ R+
• h∗(k, s′) = h∗(k, s).
• `(k, s′) = `(k, s).
• u(t, s) = u(t, s′).
In addition,
PROFD(s′) = αPROFD(s)
EXTD(s′) = e−(1−α)(p−c)EXTD(s, p)
Proof of Lemma 7. First note that for all types t, their optimal effort under policy s′ is the same as under policy s:
h∗(k, s′) =
(
ln(yk) + (1− α)(p− c)− αc− (1− α)p
k
)+
=
(
ln(yk)− c
k
)+
= h∗(k, s)
Also:
RISK(k, s′) = e−αc−(1−α)p−kh
∗(k,s′)
= e−(1−α)(p−c) · e−kh∗(k,s′)−c = e−(1−α)(p−c)RISK(k, s)
And:
`(k, s′) = ye(1−α)(p−c)RISK(k, s′) + h∗(k, s′)
= yRISK(k, s) + h∗(k, s) = `(k, s)
Which implies that:
u(t, s′) = v − `(t, s′)− p = v − `(t, s)− p = u(t, s).
We can conclude that a type t purchases in policy s iff type t purchases in policy s′. Therefore:
PROFD(s′) = (p− αc− (1− α)p)Prt←D[u(t, s′) ≥ 0]
= α(p− c)Prt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]
= αPROFD(s)
and finally:
EXTD(s′) = Et←D[RISK(t, s′)|u(t, s′) ≥ 0]
= e−(1−α)(p−c)Et←D[RISK(t, s)|u(t, s) ≥ 0]
= e−(1−α)(p−c)EXTD(s)
which concludes the proof.
This concludes the proof of bullet two of Theorem 2.
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6.3 Example: The Profits-Maximizing Qualification is Necessary
In this section we provide the example promised in Proposition 5. Consider the following distribution, and profits
constraint R := 0.5:
Dv =
{
v1 = 1 w. p. 12
v2 = 16/15 w. p. 12
Dk =
{
k1 = 3 w. p. 12
k2 = x→∞ w. p. 12
Above, x will be finite, but approaching∞, and ε will be finite but approaching 0). The proposition will follow from
the following sequence of claims. First, we will establish bullet one for T := 3.
Claim 7. A fine policy is optimal for Dv × {3}.
Proof of Claim 7. To establish the claim, we will directly find the c∗ which is maximal among those such that
PROF(0, c, p) ≥ 0.5, and observe that T = 1 + 1/c∗.
Indeed, if c = 0.5, then Dv − c takes value ≥ 1/2 with probability 1, so profits 0.5 is indeed achievable. However, for
any c > 0.5, Dv − c takes value w1 < 1/2 with probability 1/2, and w2 < 1 with probability 1/2. So setting either
price w1 or w2 yields profits < 1/2. So c∗ = 1/2 for this example, and 3 = 1 + 1/c∗ as desired.
Bullet two now immediately follows, as Dk is indeed supported on [3,∞). We now just need to find the optimal fine
policy for Dv ×Dk, and establish a better policy that is not simple. We now search for the optimal fine policy. Such a
policy might sell only to (16/15, x), but then the profits is at most 4/5, which is too little. Such a policy might sell only
to (16/15, x) and (1, x). But since x is finite, such a policy certainly charges price < 1 (unless y = 0, in which case
the policy sells to all four types), and sells with probability ≤ 1/2, so the profits are also too small. Such a policy might
sell to all four types, which we analyze below. Or it might sell to all types except (1, 3), which we analyze after.
Claim 8. The optimal fine policy s which sells to all four types has EXTDv×Dk(s) ≥ 12√e .
Proof of Claim 8. Such a policy necessarily has `(3, y) ≤ 1/2, which means that we must have ln(3y)+13 ≤ 1/2, or
y ≤ √e/3. Such a policy has externalities at least 12 · 33·√e = 12√e .
Claim 9. The optimal fine policy s which sells to all types except (1, 3) has EXTDv×Dk(s) ≥ e−1/5/3.
Proof of Claim 9. Such a policy certainly has 16/15− `(3, y) ≥ 2/3, as we are now selling with probability 3/4, so we
must charge a price at least 2/3 in order to get profits ≥ 1/2. Observe that 16/15 = 2/3 + 2/5, so we must now have
`(3, y) ≤ 2/5. That yields ln(3)+ln(y)+1 ≤ 6/5, or y ≤ e1/5/3. So the externalities are at least 13 · 3e1/53 = e−1/5/3.
Corollary 10. The optimal fine policy s has EXTDv×Dk(s) ≥ e−1/5/3.
Here’s now some intuition for how we’re going to design a better non-simple policy: given that we wish to sell to all
types except (1, 3), we can set y very close to 0 and have RISK(x, s) ≈ 0, because x is so large. The remaining question
is then whether we wish to use y or c to make the risk of (16/15, 3) as small as possible. Note that we must keep their
loss under 2/5 < 1/2 (as above). But for k = 3, a loss of 1/2 is exactly the cutoff when it becomes more efficient to
use a fine policy instead of a cost policy. So if we use c instead, we can get the risk lower for the same loss.
Claim 11. Let ε be such that ln(x)+1x ≤ ε. Then set c = 1/3−ε, and y = (2/5−c)ec. Then EXTDv×Dk(y, c, 2/3+c) =
2
3yx + e
−1/3+ε/3 and PROFDv×Dk(y, c, 2/3 + c) = 1/2.
Proof of Claim 11. `(3, (y, c)) ≤ ye−c = (2/5− c)ec · e−c = 2/5− c. So (16/15, 3) is willing to pay c+ 2/3.
`(x, (y, c)) = ln(xy)−c+1x =
ln(x(2/5−c))+ln(ec)−c+1
x =
ln(x)+ln(2/5−c)+1
x . Because
ln(x)+1+ln(2/5−c)
x ≤ ln(x)+1x ≤ ε,
the loss is ≤ ε = 1/3 − c, so (1, x) is willing to pay c + 2/3. Finally, we just need to compute the externalities
and profits. The profits are exactly 1/2, as it sells with probability 3/4 and achieves profit 2/3 when selling. The
externalities are exactly 23 · 1yx + 13 · e−c.
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Now, we just need to compare e−1/5/3 and e−1/3+ε/3 + 23yx . Observe that as x → ∞, ε → 0 and e−1/3+ε/3
approaches e−1/3/3. So 23yx + e
−1/3+ε/3→ 0 + e−1/3/3 < e−1/5/3, and the externalities are indeed lower.
As a sanity check, we’ll show that ((2/5−c)e1/3−ε, 1/3−ε, 2/3+c) is not profits-maximizing (technically, Theorem 2
doesn’t imply this, since we didn’t prove that the scheme is optimal. But as this scheme is better than all fine policies,
certainly the optimal policy is not simple, and therefore not profits-maximizing by Theorem 2. So the fourth bullet is
already proven).
Claim 12. ((2/5− c)e1/3−ε, 1/3− ε, 2/3 + c) is not profits-maximizing.
Proof of Claim 12. The four quantities of value minus loss are equal to: {16/15 − ε, 1 − ε, 1 − ε, 14/15 − ε}. The
seller generates profits 1/2 by setting price 2/3+c. If instead they set price 3/5+c, the item would sell with probability
1 and yield profits 3/5.
7 General Distributions: An Approximation
In this section, we consider general distributions. Clearly, one should not expect a simple policy to be optimal in general.
Given that simple policies are optimal for homogeneous populations, one might reasonably expect that simple policies
are approximately optimal for general distributions by simply ignoring half of the population and targeting the half that
is responsible for most of the externalities. This idea works in one direction: if the “low k” region is responsible for
most of the externalities in the optimum solution, then using a cost policy for the entire distribution is a good idea: the
high k consumers may have significantly higher risk than previously, but this doesn’t outweigh the original risk from
the low k region.
This idea fails horribly, however, if the “high k” region is responsible for most of the externalities in the optimum
solution. The problem is that while we can choose a policy to exclusively target this subpopulation, any low k (think:
k = 0) consumers who choose to purchase anyway may have enormous risk in comparison to before (i.e. it could
now be 1 when it was previously e−c for large c). We first show that this intuition can indeed manifest in a concrete
example by presenting a lower bound in Section 7.1. This rules out a single-criterion approximation that satisfies the
profits constraint exactly, and approximates the externalities. In Section 7, we present a bicriterion approximation which
approximately satisfies the profits constraint and also approximately minimizes externalities. This approximation is our
most technical result. As such, we provide mainly proof sketches to overview the key steps.
7.1 Lower Bound on Heterogeneous Distributions
The key insight for our example is to make the profits constraint so binding that the only way to match it exactly is for
the entire population to purchase the item. Part of the population will have k = 0, and part will have k →∞. With both
c and y, it will be feasible to get the k →∞ consumers to have risk essentially 0, while the k = 0 consumers will have
reasonably small risk. But with either c = 0 or y = 0, one of these will be lost, which causes significant risk increase.
Example 2. Let Dv be a point mass at v0 = 2ex/2 · (x+ e−x). Let Dk be a distribution with two point masses, one at
k = 0 with probability e−x/2, one at exe
x/2
with probability 1− e−x/2. Let R := v0 − e−x − x.
Lemma 8. The policy (1, x,R+ x) achieves profit R in Example 2, and has externalities ≤ e−x/2 · e−x + 1 · e−xex/2 .
Proof. The utility of (v0, 0) is exactly v0 − e−x −R− x = 0, so they will choose to purchase. (v0, exex/2) has only
larger utility, so they will purchase as well. Therefore, the profit is indeed R.
The externalities are computed simply as the probability of having consumer (v0, 0) times their risk (e−x) plus (upper
bound on the) probability of consumer (v0, exe
x/2
) times their risk (e−xe
x/2
).
Lemma 9. Any cost policy that achieves profit R has externalities at least e−x+1
Proof. The maximum security we can set and still have profit R is x+ e−x. If we set this, then the risk of all consumers
(which is now independent of k) is e−x+e
−x ≥ e−x+1.
Lemma 10. Any fine policy that achieves profit R has externalities at least e−x/2.
Proof. To achieve profit R, the policy must sell to the entire population. The consumer with k = 0 will not put in any
effort, and therefore their risk will be one, and the externalities will be at least e−x/2.
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Corollary 13. For all x, there exists a distribution Dv ×Dk and profits constraint R such that the optimal policy is
not simple, and any simple policy that satisfies profits constraints R has externalities at least a factor of x larger than
the optimum.
Corollary 13 is the main result of this section. Clearly the distribution witnessing Corollary 13 is highly contrived and
unrealistic. And clearly, the way to get around this is to allow for a slight relaxation in the profits constraint so that we
don’t have to sell to the entire market (indeed, even allowing to relax the constraint by a (1− e−x/2) fraction in this
case would suffice). So the subsequent section shows that by relaxing the profits constraint, an approximation guarantee
is possible.
7.2 A Bicriterion approximation
Given the lower bound in Section 7.1, we show that simple policies guarantee a bicriterion approximation. As is
traditional with worst-case approximation guarantees, our constants are not particularly close to 1, but are still relatively
small. This is not meant to imply that the seller should be happy with (e.g.) a 1/8-fraction of the original profits, but
more qualitatively to conclude that simple policies can reap many of the benefits of optimal ones (see Hartline (2013)
for further discussion about the role of approximation in mechanism design). As referenced previously, the proof of
Theorem 3 is quite technical, so we sketch the key steps and left the proof to Appendix A.
Theorem 3. For all distributions D, and all policies s, there exists a simple policy s′ such that
PROFD(s′) ≥ PROFD(s)/8,
EXTD(s′) ≤ 40/3 · EXTD(s).
Proof Sketch. Given an arbitrary policy s = (y, c, p), consider the conditional distribution of buyers that purchase
under s. If with constant probability a buyer has efficiency k ≤ 1, then we output the cost policy s1 := (0, c +
`(σ, s), p+ `(σ, s)) where σ is chosen such that a buyer continues to purchase with constant probability. We can show
that c+ `(σ, s) is sufficiently large such that RISK(Dk, s′) ≤ RISK(Dk, s) with constant probability.
For the case where with constant probability a buyer has efficiency k > 1, we define a blowup of the fines such that
with constant probability a buyer continues to purchase but with the hope that inefficient buyers stop to purchase. The
blowup can fail in two conditions: (1) Dk is not heavy tail, (2) Dv is heavy tail. For (1), we cannot derive a significant
blowup if Dk is concentrated close to 1. For (2), we cannot drive inefficient buyers out of the market if they have high
value. Either condition allow us to construct cost policies that give good externality guarantees.
8 Summary
We propose a stylized model to study regulation of single item sales with negative externalities, from which neither
the buyer nor seller suffer. We first show that a simple policy is optimal in homogenous markets: That is, for all Dv,
R, there exists a cutoff T such that when the effectiveness of consumers ranges in [0, T ], the optimal policy regulates
only the product (and does not impose fines). Similarly, if all consumers have effectiveness in [T,∞), a policy which
regulates only payments (via fines, and does not impose default security features) outperforms all profits-maximizing
policies. Importantly, T is not necessarily the cutoff at which the consumers are more effective than the producer (which
would be T = 1), but actually depends on the value distribution Dv and profit constraint R.
We then show in general markets that while a simple policy may not be optimal, one is always approximately optimal.
In particular, we show that while no simple scheme can guarantee any finite approximation while satisfying the
profit constraint exactly, a bicriterion approximation exist, which approximately satisfies the profit constraint and also
approximately minimizes externalities. Going forward, we must better understand the effectiveness of consumers to
decide which regulation strategy is more appropriate to approximately minimizes externalities.
While stylized, our model captures the key salient features of this problem. We chose to study the single seller/single
item setting in order to isolate these features without bringing in additional complexities (and the numerous examples
throughout our paper demonstrate that even the single seller/single item setting is quite rich). Now that our results
develop this understanding, a good direction for future work is to consider competing sellers or multiple items.
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A Proof of Theorem 3
We define the necessary tools for the case where a constant fraction of the population that purchase has efficiency k ≤ 1
in Appendix A.1 and proof approximation guarantees in Appendix A.1.1. For the case where a constant fraction of the
population that purchase has efficiency k > 1, we define the necessary tools in Appendix A.2 and proof approximation
guarantees in Appendix A.2.4. In Appendix A.3, we combine the approximation guarantees to complete the proof of
Theorem 3.
Notation Policy s induces a threshold k0(s) := inf{k|h∗(s, t) > 0} of types with zero effort. Let kh(s) :=
max{1, k0(s)}, and define the events:
A(s) := {t← D purchase under s}
B(s) := A(s) ∩ {t← D has efficiency k > kh(s)}
We define the buyer’s value after regulation:
VALUE(t, s) := v − `(t, s)
then event A(s) is equivalent to VALUE(t, s) ≥ p or u(t, s) ≥ 0.
Space Partition Given (D,R), and some arbitrary policy s = (y, c, p). Let’s look over the distribution of buyers that
purchase under s. More formally, we will consider the following partition of the probability space:
ε1 = Pr
t←D
[k ≤ k0(s)|u(t, s) ≥ 0]
ε2 = Pr
t←D
[k0(s) < k ≤ 1|u(t, s) ≥ 0]
ε3 = Pr
t←D
[k > kh(s)|u(t, s) ≥ 0]
The key idea behind our approximation mechanism, Algorithm 1, consists of defining three transformations of s.
The cost policy COST1, Equation (7) in Appendix A.1, guarantees a constant approximation proportional to ε1 and
ε2. Algorithm 2, Appendix A.2, denoted by FINE outputs a simple policy that guarantees a constant approximation
proportional to ε3.
Input: s = (y, c, p), D
1: Let β = 12
2: if ε1 ≥ 18 then
3: Output COST1(s, 1)
4: end if
5: if ε2 ≥ 18 then
6: Output COST1(s, ε1 + ε2)
7: else
8: Output FINE(s)
9: end if
Algorithm 1: APPROX
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A.1 Approximation with Low Efficiency Buyers
Next, we define the tools to proof Theorem 3 for the case where ε1 + ε2 = O(1) and postpone the proof to Ap-
pendix A.1.1. The following policy clearly meets the profit guarantees when ε = O(1).
COST1(s, ε) := (0, c+ `(σ, s), p+ `(σ, s)) (7)
where ε ∈ [0, 1], and we choose σ such that Prt←D[v ≥ `(σ, s) + p] = εPrt←D[v ≥ `(k, s) + p].
Zero efficiency case For COST1(s, 1), we get a good approximation to the externalities whenever a constant fraction
ε1 of the consumers who purchase have h∗(t, s) = 0. This is because the externalities are at least ε1 · e−c under s, and
our new externalities are just e−c. So if ε1 is big enough, we get our desired approximation, Corollary 14.
Non-Zero efficiency case If ε2 is big, then ε2 1y is a good lower bound for EXTD(s). This implies we must target a
cost proportional to ln y. For COST1(s, ε2), we can argue `(σ, s) is at least 1 + ln y which implies good externality
bounds, Corollary 15.
A.1.1 Proof of Approximation with Low Efficiency Buyers
Lemma 11. Let ε ∈ [0, 1], then
PROFD(COST1(s, ε)) = εPROFD(s, ε)
EXTD(COST1(s, ε)) =
e−c−`(σ,s)
Et←D[RISK(t, s)|u(t, s) ≥ 0] EXTD(s)
Proof. By our choice of σ,
Prt←D[v ≥ p+ `(σ, s)] = εPrt←D[v ≥ p+ `(k, s)]
This implies the following bounds in the profit,
PROFD(COST1(s, ε)) = (p+ `(σ, s)− c− `(σ, s))Prt←D[v ≥ p+ `(σ, s)]
= (p− c)εPrt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]
= εPROFD(s)
For the externality,
EXTD(COST1(s, ε))
EXTD(s)
=
e−c−`(σ,s)
Et←D[RISK(t, s)|u(t, s) ≥ 0]
which concludes the proof.
Corollary 14.
PROFD(COST1(s, 1)) = PROFD(s)
PROFD(COST1(s, 1)) ≤ 1
ε1
EXTD(s)
Proof. The profit bound follows directly from Lemma 11. For the externality,
EXTD(s) ≥ ε1Et←D[RISK(t, s)|u(t, s) ≥ 0, k ≤ k0(s)]
= ε1e
−c
then,
EXTD(COST1(s, 1))
EXTD(s)
=
e−c−`(σ,s)
EXTD(s)
≤ e
−c
ε1e−c
which concludes the proof.
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Corollary 15. Assume ε2 > 0, then
PROFD(COST1(s, ε2)) ≥ (ε1 + ε2)PROFD(s)
EXTD(COST1(s, ε2)) ≤ 1
ε2e
EXTD(s)
Proof. We will first claim `(σ, s) ≥ `(1, s). Assume for contradiction `(σ, s) < `(1, s), then it must be
(ε1 + ε2)Prt←D[v ≥ p+ `(k, s)] = Prt←D[v ≥ p+ `(σ, s)]
> Prt←D[v ≥ p+ `(1, s)]
≥ Prt←D[v ≥ p+ `(k, s)|k ≤ 1]
=
Prt←D[k ≤ 1|u(t, s) ≥ 0]Prt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]
Prt←D[k ≤ 1]
≥ Prt←D[k ≤ 1|u(t, s) ≥ 0]Prt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]
= (ε1 + ε2)Prt←D[v ≥ p+ `(k, s)]⇒⇐
where the first equality follows by the choice of σ in Equation (7) and the second equality follows by Bayes’ theorem.
Next, we bound the externality with Lemma 11. We use the fact σ ≤ 1 and since ε2 > 0, it must be h∗(1, s) > 0.
EXTD(COST1(s, ε2))
EXTD(s)
=
e−c−`(σ,s)
Et←D[RISK(t, s)|u(t, s) ≥ 0]
≤ e
−c−`(1,s)
ε2Et←D[1/yk|u(t, s) ≥ 0, k0(s) < k ≤ 1]
=
ye−c−1−ln y+c
ε2Et←D[1/k|u(t, s) ≥ 0, k0(s) < k ≤ 1]
≤ 1
eε2
The profit bound follow directly from Lemma 11 which concludes the proof.
A.2 Approximation with High Efficiency Buyers
In this section, we define the tools to proof Theorem 3 for the case where ε3 = O(1). We will construct FINE(s),
Algorithm 2, which targets the population that purchases under s and have high efficiency k > kh(s). To construct
FINE(s), we will further define three additional transformations described in this section.
As motivation consider Example 2. Ideally, we would like to make the inefficient buyer to stop to purchase. FINE(s)
will first consider a blowup of the fines, BLOWUP(s) in Definition 4, dependent on the population that purchase under s.
The blowup cannot be too high; otherwise, the utility of the efficient buyer decreases too much, hurting profit.
If the inefficient buyer is still willing to purchase after the blowup, it must be because the buyer value distribution has
a heavy tail. In that case, we can derive the transformation HEAVY(s), Equation (11), that leverages the tail of the
distribution to impose high security regulation directly on the product.
A.2.1 Preliminaries
Let G(x|E) := Pr[k ≤ x|E ] denote the cumulative distribution function of efficiency conditioned on event E . We will
assume ε = Prt←D[k > kh(s)|VALUE(t, s) ≥ p(s)]. The parameter β ∈ [0, 1] parameterize the fraction of the profit
we are willing to compromise.
A.2.2 Blowup
Definition 4 (Blowup transformation). We define,
σ := max
{
1, G−1(1− β|B(s))
}
(8)
BLOWUP(s) := (qyec(σ−1), 0, p− c) (9)
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Input: β ∈ [0, 1], s = (y, c, p), D
1: ε = Prt←D[k > kh(s)|VALUE(t, s) ≥ p(s)]
2: if c ≤ 1 then
3: Output INV(s, p, p/(p− c))
4: end if
5: if BLOWUP(s) is good then
6: Output BLOWUP ◦ INV(s, 1/2)
7: else
8: if σ ≥ 2 then
9: Output HEAVY(s)
10: else
11: if ∃x ∈ [e−c, 1],COST3x(s) is good then
12: if ye−c < 2 then
13: Output COST1(s, 1)
14: else
15: Output COST3x(s)
16: end if
17: else
18: Output BLOWUP ◦ INV(s, 1/2)
19: end if
20: end if
21: end if
Algorithm 2: FINE(s)
where
q := inf{x ≥ 1|Prt←D[A(xyeσ−1, 0, p− c)] ≤ Prt←D[VALUE(t, s) ≥ p]}
We define ysk(s) as the fine of BLOWUP(s),
ysk(s) := qye
c(σ−1)
We define k¯(s) as the efficiency k such that RISK(k¯(s),BLOWUP(s)) = e−c,
k¯(s) :=
ec
ysk(s)
By construction, if β is big, then BLOWUP(s) will always provide good profit guarantees, Claim 16. For the externalities,
we can also ensure BLOWUP(s) will provide good externality guarantees for the population that used to purchase
under s and had efficiency k ≥ k¯(s), Claim 17. This is because ysk(s) ≥ y; therefore, if h∗(k, s) > 0, we must have
RISK(k,BLOWUP(s)) ≤ RISK(k, s). If h∗(k, s) = 0, then we can have RISK(k,BLOWUP(s)) > RISK(k, s) if k is
small. k¯(s) precisely captures this phase change such that if k ≥ k¯(s), then RISK(k,BLOWUP(s)) ≤ RISK(k, s) and if
k < k¯(s), RISK(k,BLOWUP(s)) > RISK(k, s).
To proof approximation bounds for BLOWUP(s) for the population where k < k¯(s), we first discuss the case where
σ ≥ 2. We discuss the case where σ < 2 on Appendix A.2.3.
Assuming σ is sufficiently large, BLOWUP(s) would still fail to provide good externality guarantees if the probability
that a buyer with efficiency k < k¯(s) purchase under BLOWUP(s) is high.
Unfortunately, for arbitrary distributions, we should not expect buyers with efficiency k < k¯(s) will have a small
contribution to externalities under BLOWUP(s). However, we can define an upper bound on their externalities that
would be sufficient to proof externality guarantees for BLOWUP(s), Claim 18.
Definition 5 (Good Blowup). BLOWUP(s) is good if buyers with efficiency at most k¯(s) give a small contribution to
externalities:
Et←D[RISK(t,BLOWUP(s)) · I(k ≤ k¯(s))|A(BLOWUP(s))] ≤ 4(p− c)
(1− β)(1 + c)εEXTD(s) (10)
Composition Observe the dependence on p− c on the externality bound which can be arbitrarily large. This can be
easily be solved by applying a composition of BLOWUP with INV. This is because Lemma 7 states the probability
space of s and INV(s, ·) is the same and by sacrificing a constant fraction of the profit we reduce externalities by a
factor of O
(
1
p−c
)
.
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Heavy Tail If BLOWUP(s) fails to push inefficient buyers out of the market (buyers with efficiency k < k¯(s) cause
high externalities), it must be because the value distribution Dv has a heavy tail. In that scenario, we define the policy
HEAVY(s) that impose high regulation in the product and ensure constant approximation ratio, Claim 19.
HEAVY(s) :=
(
0,
1
2
pHEAVY, pHEAVY
)
(11)
where
pHEAVY := `(k¯(s),BLOWUP(s)) =
(
(1 + c)qyecσ
e2c
)
(12)
A.2.3 When the Blowup is Small
For the case where σ < 2, we might hope cost policies can still provide a good approximation since it suggests Dk
has a short tail. Next, we construct a family of cost policies H(s) such that if no policy s ∈ H(s) gives good profit
guarantees, we can proof externality guarantees for BLOWUP(s), Claim 24.
Under BLOWUP(s), in order for a buyer to have risk x ∈ [e−c, 1], she must draw efficiency k = 1ysk(s)x and observe
k ≤ k¯(s).
We define an alternative expression for the loss of k under fine y and cost c = 0 as function of its risk x:
`RISK(x, y) := (ln 1/x+ 1)xy (13)
Let H(x) be the probability a value is greater or equal to the loss `RISK(x, ysk(s)).
H(x) := Prt←D
[
v ≥
(
ln
1
x
+ 1
)
xysk(s)
]
(14)
We define the cost policy COST3x(s) where the probability of sale under COST
3
x(s) is equivalent to H(x),
COST3x(s) :=
(
0, ln y,
(
ln
1
x
+ 1
)
xysk(s)
)
We define the family of cost policiesH(s),
H(s) := {COST3x(s) : x ∈ [e−c, 1]}
We can verify Prt←D[A(COST3x(s))] = H(x),
Prt←D
[
VALUE(t,COST3x(s)) ≥
(
ln
1
x
+ 1
)
xysk(s)
]
= H(x)
because `(k,COST3x(s)) = 0 for all k.
Since Dk has a short tail (σ is small), all policies in s ∈ H(s) would give good externality guarantees when compared
to s, Claim 22; however, the probability of sale might be too small to get good profit guarantees. Bellow, we define
a sufficient condition to proof a policy in H would give good profit guarantees and the formal statement is given in
Claim 22.
Definition 6 (Good COST3x(s)). We define COST
3
x(s) as good if its probability of sale is bigger than
H(x) ≥ 2βεPROFD(s)
(ln 1/x+ 1)xysk(s)
If Definition 6 is not satisfied for any policy inH, it implies the probability of sale to buyers with efficiency k < k¯(s)
under BLOWUP(s) is bounded. This implies, we can directly bound the externalities contributed by k < k(s) and proof
externality guarantees for BLOWUP(s), Claim 23.
A.2.4 Proof of Approximation for High Efficiency Buyers
In this section, we bound the profit and the externality for the output of Algorithm 2.
Claim 16.
Prt←D[A(BLOWUP(s))] ≥ βεPrt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]
PROFD(BLOWUP(s)) ≥ βεPROFD(s)
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Proof. We will first bound the probability that a type t that purchase under policy s and has efficiency at least kh(s),
also purchase under policy s′ = BLOWUP(s). Given that t purchase under policy s, we must have p ≤ VALUE(t, s),
then
Prt←D[VALUE(t, s′) ≥ p− c|B(s)] ≥ Prt←D[VALUE(t, s′) ≥ VALUE(t, s)− c|B(s)]
= Prt←D[v − 1 + ln y + ln k − c
k
− cσ
k
≥ v − 1 + ln y + ln k − c
k
− c|B(s)]
= Prt←D[k ≥ σ|B(s)] = β
In the last step, we use the fact σ = G−1(1− β|B(s)).
Next, we lower bound the probability of sale and the profit under policy s′.
Prt←D[VALUE(t, s′) ≥ p− c] ≥ Prt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]
· Prt←D[k > kh(s)|u(t, s) ≥ 0]
· Prt←D[VALUE(t, s′) ≥ p− c|B(s)]
≥ βεPrt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]
PROFD(s′) = (p− c)Prt←D[VALUE(t, s′) ≥ p− c]
≥ βε(p− c)Prt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]
= βεPROFD(s)
which concludes the proof.
Claim 17.
Et←D[RISK(t,BLOWUP(s)) · I(k > k¯(s))|A(BLOWUP(s))] ≤ 1
εβ
Et←D[RISK(t, s) · I(k > k¯(s))|u(t, s) ≥ 0]
Proof. Let s′ = BLOWUP(s). If k > k¯(s), we can have either h∗(k, s) > 0 or h∗(k, s) = 0. In the first case, by
definition of BLOWUP(s), y′ ≥ y, and together with h∗(k, s) > 0 implies RISK(k, s′) ≤ RISK(k, s). If instead,
h∗(k, s) = 0, r(k, s) = e−c, but since k > k¯(s), r(k,BLOWUP(s)) ≤ e−c. So in all cases, r(k, s′) ≤ r(k, s).
Still by construction of BLOWUP(s), the probability VALUE(t,BLOWUP(s)) ≥ p − c is at most the probability
u(t, s) ≥ 0. By a similar argument in Corollary 6, gs,s′(k) is monotone decreasing which implies the set of types that
start to purchase under s′ can only be more efficient than the set of types that stops to purchase. We can conclude
Et←D[RISK(t, s′) · I(k > k¯(s), u(t, s′) ≥ 0)] ≤ Et←D[RISK(t, s) · I(k > k¯(s), u(t, s) ≥ 0)]
We can re-write the expectations as
Et←D[RISK(t, s′) · I(k > k¯(s), u(t, s′) ≥ 0)] = Et←D[RISK(t, s′) · I(k > k¯(s))|u(t, s′) ≥ 0]Prt←D[u(t, s′) ≥ 0]
By Claim 16, Prt←D[u(t, s′) ≥ 0] ≥ βεPrt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0], then
Et←D[RISK(t, s′) · I(k > k¯(s))|u(t, s′) ≥ 0] ≤ Et←D[RISK(t, s) · I(k > k¯(s))|u(t, s) ≥ 0] Prt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]
βεPrt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]
which concludes the proof.
Claim 18. If BLOWUP(s) is good, then
EXTD(BLOWUP(s)) ≤
(
4(p− c)
(1− β)(1 + c)ε +
1
βε
)
EXTD(s) (15)
Proof. By combining Definition 5, Claim 17 that bounds the expected risk of buyers with efficiency in the intervals
[0, k¯(s)], (k¯(s),∞) respectively, the result follows.
Claim 19. If BLOWUP(s) is bad and σ ≥ 2, c ≥ 1, then
PROFD(HEAVY(s)) ≥ βεPROFD(s)
EXTD(HEAVY(s)) ≤ 4
(1− β)(c+ 1)εEXTD(s)
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Proof. Let n = 4(p−c)(1−β)(1+c)ε , s
′ = BLOWUP(s). We first bound the probability of sale of HEAVY(s).
By Equation (12), pHEAVY = `(k¯(s), s′) which implies
Prt←D[v ≥ `(k¯(s), s′) + p(s′)] ≤ Prt←D[v ≥ `(k¯(s), s′)]
≤ Prt←D[u(t,HEAVY(s)) ≥ 0]
where the last inequality follows from VALUE(t,HEAVY(s)) = v since HEAVY(s) is a cost policy.
For a fixed price p, the probability of sale must decrease as we decrease efficiency, then
Prt←D[A(HEAVY(s))] ≥ Prt←D[v ≥ `(k¯(s), s′) + p(s′)]
≥ Prt←D[u(t, s′) ≥ 0|k ≤ k¯(s)]
=
Prt←D[k ≤ k¯(s)|u(t, s′) ≥ 0]Prt←D[u(t, s′) ≥ 0]
Prt←D[k ≤ k¯(s)]
where the equality comes from Bayes’ theorem.
Next, we bound Prt←D[k ≤ k¯(s)|u(t, s′) ≥ 0]. The inequality comes from the fact RISK(t, s′) ≤ 1,
Et←D[RISK(t, s′) · I(k ≤ k¯(s))|u(t, s′) ≥ 0] ≤ Et←D[I(k ≤ k¯(s))|u(t, s′) ≥ 0]
= Prt←D[k ≤ k¯(s)|u(t, s′) ≥ 0]
This implies,
Prt←D[A(HEAVY(s))] ≥ Prt←D[k ≤ k¯(s)|u(t, s′) ≥ 0]Prt←D[u(t, s′) ≥ 0]
≥ Et←D[RISK(t, s′) · I(k ≤ k¯(s))|u(t, s′) ≥ 0]Prt←D[u(t, s′) ≥ 0]
Using the assumption that s′ is bad, and Claim 16 to lower bound Prt←D[u(t, s′) ≥ 0], we get Equation (16)
Prt←D[u(t,HEAVY(s)) ≥ 0] ≥ βεnPrt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]EXTD(s) (16)
Next, we lower bound the profit of HEAVY(s). In the first equality, we use the definition of pHEAVY, Equation (12). In
the first inequality, we lower bound the probabily of sale of HEAVY(s), Equation (16). In the second inequality, we use
the fact PROFD(s) = (p− c)Prt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0].
PROF(HEAVY(s)) =
pHEAVY
2
Prt←D[v ≥ pHEAVY]
=
(1 + c)qyecσ
2e2c
Prt←D[v ≥ pHEAVY]
≥ (1 + c)ye
cσ
2e2c
βεnPrt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]EXTD(s)
≥ βεn
(
(1 + c)yecσ
2(p− c)e2c
)
EXTD(s)PROFD(s)
Next, we bound Et←D[1/k|B(s)] and EXTD(s),
Proposition 20.
Et←D[1/k|u(t, s) ≥ 0, k > kh(s)] ≥ 1− β
σ
EXTD(s) ≥ ε(1− β)
yσ
Proof.
Et←D[1/k|B(s)] ≥ Prt←D[k ≤ σ|B(s)]Et←D[1/k|u(t, s) ≥ 0, k ∈ (kh(s), σ]]
≥ (1− β)
σ
By definition of EXTD(s), and the previous bound
EXTD(s) ≥ εEt←D[1/yk|B(s)]
≥ ε(1− β)
yσ
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By Proposition 20,
PROF(HEAVY(s)) ≥ βε
2n
2
(
(1− β)(1 + c)ecσ
σ(p− c)e2c
)
PROFD(s)
=
βε2n
2
(
(1− β)(1 + c)e2c+(c−1)(σ−2)+(σ−2)
σ(p− c)e2c
)
PROFD(s)
Using the fact c ≥ 1, σ ≥ 2, eσ/σ ≥ e2/2 and substituting for n,
PROF(HEAVY(s)) ≥ (1− β)βε
2n(1 + c)eσ
σ2e2(p− c) PROFD(s)
≥ βε
2n(1 + c)
2e2(p− c)
(1− β)eσ
σ
PROFD(s)
≥ βεPROFD(s)
Similarly, we bound the externalities,
EXTD(HEAVY(s)) = e−pHEAVY/2
≤ e− (1+c)ye
cσ
2e2c
= e−
(1+c)ye2c+c(σ−2)
2e2c
≤ e− (1+c)ye
c(σ−2)
2
<
2
(1 + c)yec(σ−2)
≤ 2
(1 + c)ye(c−1)(σ−2)+(σ−2)
Using the fact c ≥ 1, σ ≥ 2, eσ/σ ≥ e2/2 and dividing and multiplying by Et←D[1/k|B(s)],
EXTD(HEAVY(s)) ≤ 2e
2εEt←D[1/k|B(s)]
(c+ 1)yEt←D[eσ/k|B(s)]
≤ 4e
2
(1− β)(c+ 1)εe2 EXTD(s)
where the second inequality follows from Proposition 20.
Claim 21. If ye−c < 2, σ < 2 then
PROFD(COST1(s, 1− δ)) = (1− δ)PROFD(s)
EXTD(COST1(s, 1− δ)) ≤ 4
ε(1− β) EXTD(s)
Proof. We will proof ye−c < 2 implies Et←D[1/yk · I(k > kh)|u(t, s) ≥ 0] ≥ e
−cε(1−β)
4 , and the statement follows
directly by Lemma 11.
Et←D[1/yk · I(k > kh)|u(t, s) ≥ 0] > εe
−c
2
Et←D[1/k|u(t, s) ≥ 0, k > kh]
≥ εe
−c(1− β)
2σ
>
εe−c(1− β)
4
where the second inequality follows by Proposition 20.
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Claim 22. Assume ye−c ≥ 2, and σ ≤ 2. If for some x ∈ [e−c, 1], COST3x(s) is good, then
PROFD(COST3x(s)) ≥ βεPROFD(s)
EXTD(COST3x(s)) ≤
2
ε(1− β) EXTD(s)
Proof. To bound
(
ln 1x + 1
)
x when x ∈ [e−c, 1], note it achieves its minimum value when x = e−c which
implies
(
ln 1x + 1
)
x ≥ (c + 1)e−c. We can then bound the net profit of policy COST3x(s). More precisely,
we claim pCOST3x(s) − ln y ≥
(
ln 1x+1
)
xysk(s)
2 . By definition pCOST3x(s) =
(
ln 1x + 1
)
xysk(s) and we will show
pCOST3x(s) ≥ 2 ln y.(
ln
1
x
+ 1
)
xysk(s) ≥ (c+ 1)e−cye−cecσ
≥ (c+ 1)ye−c
≥ 2c+ ye−c by the fact ye−c ≥ 2
Write ln y = ln ye−c + c and observe ye−c ≥ 2 ln ye−c by the fact ye−c ≥ 2. We can conclude 2c + ye−c ≥
2(c+ ln ye−c) = 2 ln y which implies pCOST3x(s) − ln y ≥
(
ln 1x+1
)
xysk(s)
2 .
By the fact COST3x(s) is good, H(x) ≥ 2βεPROFD(s)(ln 1/x+1)xysk(s) , then
PROFD(COST3x(s)) = (pCOST3x(s) − ln y)H(x)
≥
(
ln 1x + 1
)
xysk(s)
2
2βεPROFD(s)(
ln 1x + 1
)
xysk(s)
≥ βεPROFD(s)
Next, we bound the externalities,
EXTD(COST3x(s))
EXTD(s)
=
1
yEXTD(s)
≤ yσ
yε(1− β)
<
2
ε(1− β)
where the first inequality follows from Proposition 20 and the second inequality follows from σ < 2.
Claim 23. If σ ≤ 2, and ∀x ∈ [e−c, 1], COST3x(s) is bad, then
Et←D[RISK(t,BLOWUP(s)) · I(k ≤ k¯(s))|A(BLOWUP(s))] ≤ 4(p− c)
ε(1− β) EXTD(s)
Proof. Define µsRISK(x) = Prk←Dk [RISK(k, s) = x] and observe we can sample k by sampling a risk x from the
distribution µsRISK and computing k. Let’s compute Et←D[RISK(t, s
′) · I(k ≤ k¯(s), u(t, s′) ≥ 0)] where below, in the
first equality, we apply the tower rule by sampling a risk x from µBLOWUP(s)RISK . In the second equality, if type k has risk
x < e−c, by definition of k¯(s), we must have k > k¯(s) which implies I(k ≤ k¯(s)) = 0. In the first inequality, we use
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the fact H(x) upper bounds the probability of sale for a buyer with risk x.
Et←D[RISK(t,BLOWUP(s)) · I(k ≤ k¯(s), A(BLOWUP(s)))]
= E
x←µBLOWUP(s)RISK [Et←D[RISK(t,BLOWUP(s)) · I(k ≤ k¯(s), A(BLOWUP(s)))|RISK(k,BLOWUP(s)) = x]]
= E
x←µBLOWUP(s)RISK [x · I(x ∈ [e
−c, 1]) · Et←D[I(A(BLOWUP(s)))|RISK(k,BLOWUP(s)) = x]]
= E
x←µBLOWUP(s)RISK [x · I(x ∈ [e
−c, 1]) · Prt←D[v ≥ xysk(s)(1 + ln 1/x) + p(BLOWUP(s))]]
≤ E
x←µBLOWUP(s)RISK [x · I(x ∈ [e
−c, 1]) ·H(x)]
For all x ∈ [e−c, 1], because COST 3x (s) is bad, we must have
H(x) <
2βεPROFD(s)
(ln 1/x+ 1)xysk(s)
≤ 2βε(p− c)Prt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]
xysk(s)
This implies,
Et←D[RISK(t,BLOWUP(s)) · I(k ≤ k¯(s), A(BLOWUP(s)))]
< E
x←µBLOWUP(s)RISK [x · I(x ∈ [e
−c, 1]) · 2βε(p− c)Prt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]
xysk(s)
]
=
2βε(p− c)Prt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]
ysk(s)
Bellow, we use the fact Prt←D[A(BLOWUP(s))] ≥ βεPrt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0], Claim 16.
Et←D[RISK(t,BLOWUP(s)) · I(k ≤ k¯(s), A(BLOWUP(s)))]
= Et←D[RISK(t,BLOWUP(s)) · I(k ≤ k¯(s))|A(BLOWUP(s))]Prt←D[A(BLOWUP(s))]
≥ βεPrt←D[u(t, s) ≥ 0]Et←D[RISK(t,BLOWUP(s)) · I(k ≤ k¯(s))|A(BLOWUP(s))]
Combining the previous bounds, we have
Et←D[RISK(t,BLOWUP(s)) · I(k ≤ k¯(s))|A(BLOWUP(s))]
EXTD(s)
≤ 2(p− c)
ysk(s)EXTD(s)
≤ 2yσ(p− c)
ysk(s)(1− β)ε ≤
4(p− c)
(1− β)ε
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 20 which completes the proof.
Claim 24. If σ ≤ 2, and ∀x ∈ [e−c, 1], COST3x(s) is bad then
EXTD(BLOWUP(s)) ≤
(
4(p− c)
ε(1− β) +
1
βε
)
EXTD(s) (17)
Proof. By combining Claim 23 and 17, that bound the expected risk of buyers with efficiency in the intervals [0, k¯(s)],
(k¯(s),∞) respectively, the result follows.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3. If APPROX(s) outputs COST1(s, 1), then by Lemma 11, the profit is
PROFD(APPROX(s)) = PROFD(s)
Still by Lemma 11, the externalities are at most
EXTD(APPROX(s))
EXTD(s)
≤ e
−c
Et←D[RISK(t, s)|VALUE(t, s) ≥ p(s)]
≤ e
−c
Et←D[RISK(t, s) · I(k < k0(s))|VALUE(t, s) ≥ p(s)]
=
e−c
ε1e−c
=
1
ε1
≤ 8
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If APPROX(s) outputs COST1(s, ε1 + ε2), then by Corollary 15,
PROFD(APPROX(s)) ≥ (ε1 + ε2)PROFD(s) ≥ 1
8
PROFD(s)
EXTD(APPROX(s)) ≤ 1
ε2e
EXTD(s) ≤ 8
e
EXTD(s)
Next, Claim 25 proves approximation guarantees when APPROX(s) outpus FINE(s).
Claim 25.
PROFD(FINE(s)) ≥ 3
16
PROFD(s)
EXTD(FINE(s)) ≤ 24EXTD(s)
Proof. If APPROX(s) outputs FINE(s) then ε3 ≥ 3/4. Let’s first bound the profit of FINE(s). If FINE(s) outputs
INV(s, p, p/(p− c)), then it must be c = 1. By Lemma 7,
PROFD(FINE(s)) =
p
p− cPROFD(s) ≥ PROFD(s)
If FINE(s) outputs BLOWUP ◦ INV(s, p, 1/2), by Claim 16, and Lemma 7,
PROFD(FINE(s)) ≥ 1
2
βε3PROFD(s) ≥ 3
16
PROFD(s)
If FINE(s) outputs HEAVY(s), COST1(s, 1) or COSTx(s), then by Claim 21, 22, and Lemma 11,
PROFD(FINE(s)) ≥ βε3PROFD(s) ≥ 3
8
PROFD(s)
Let’s now bound the externality of FINE(s). If FINE(s) outputs COST1(s, 1), then Et←D[1/yk · I(k > kh(s))|A(s)] ≥
e−cε3(1−β)
4 and by Lemma 11
EXTD(FINE(s))
EXTD(s)
≤ e
−c
Et←D[RISK(t, s)|VALUE(t, s) ≥ p(s)]
≤ e
−c
Et←D[1/yk · I(k > kh(s))|A(s)]
≤ 4
ε3(1− β) ≤
32
3
If FINE(s) outputs INV(s, p, p/(p− c)), then it must be c ≤ 1 and by Lemma 7,
EXTD(FINE(s))
EXTD(s)
= ec ≤ e
If FINE(s) outputs HEAVY(s), by Claim 19,
EXTD(FINE(s))
EXTD(s)
≤ 4
(1− β)(c+ 1)ε3 ≤
8
3
If FINE(s) outputs COST3x(s), by Claim 22,
EXTD(FINE(s))
EXTD(s)
≤ 2
(1− β)ε3 =
16
3
If FINE(s) outputs BLOWUP ◦ INV(s, p, 1/2), by Claim 18, 24 and Lemma 7,
EXTD(FINE(s))
EXTD(s)
≤ e−1/2(p−c) max
{
4(p− 12c− 12p)
(1− β)(1 + 12c+ 12p)ε3
+
1
βε3
,
4(p− 12c− 12p)
(1− β)ε3 +
1
βε3
}
≤ 4(p− c)
(p− c)(1− β)ε3 +
1
βε3
=
4
(1− β)ε3 +
1
βε3
≤ 40/3
In the worst case, the profit is 3/16 of PROFD(s) and the externality is 40/3 times higher than EXTD(s) which
concludes the proofs.
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To conclude, for the profit, in the worst case, APPROX(s) outputs COST2(s) at a compromise of at most 1/8 of the
profit. For the externalities, FINE(s) will have 40/3 times more externalities than s which completes the proof.
B Profits-Maximizing Seller
In this section, we consider the a variant of our main model. Here, the seller always selects the profits-maximizing price
given y and c, and we also compute externalities differently. Specifically, we consider the three stage game where the
regulator commits on a fine y and cost c and in sequence the seller is free to select the profit optimal price p. In the
last step, the buyer decides to purchase or not. Finally, we will assume externalities are measured as the expected risk
conditioned on a buyer to purchase times the probability of purchase (i.e. the total probability of compromise, versus
compromise conditioned on purchase). One purpose of this section is to explore a variant of our model. The other
purpose is to highlight that results do not significantly change in related models.
Definition 7 (Externality). Given a policy s = (y, c, p), we define
EXTD(s) := Et←D[RISK(t, s) · I(VALUE(t, s) ≥ p)]
Observe that in Example 2, the impossibility result is shown by deriving a distribution D and profit constraint R that
can only be satisfied if everyone purchase; therefore, the impossibility follows to the profits-maximizing case.
Next, we will proof Proposition 5 for the profits-maximizing seller.
Proposition 26. For a profits-maximizing seller, there exist distributions Dv, Dk, and profits constraint R such that:
• T is such that for all k ≥ T , the externality-minimizing policy for Dv × {k} subject to profits constraints R is
a fine policy.
• Dk is supported on [T,∞).
• No fine policy is externality-minimizing policy for Dv ×Dk subject to profits constraints R.
Under profit constraint R, we can show that the optimal policy gives profits R, Corollary 27. Before we proof this
result, we will extend the invariant property, Lemma 7, to the profits-maximizing setting.
Lemma 12 (Augmented Invariant Property). Given policy s, let s′ = INV(s, α), α ∈ [0, 1], then PROFD(s′) ≥
αPROFD(s), and the optimal price of s′ is p′ ≥ p which implies EXTD(s′) ≤ e−(p−c)(1−α)EXTD(s).
Proof. Let p(s) denote the optimal price under policy s. Let c(s′) = αc+ (1− α)p. It follows,
(p(s)− c)Prt←D[VALUE(t, s) ≥ p(s)] ≥ (p(s′)− c)Prt←D[VALUE(t, s) ≥ p(s′)]
(p(s′)− c(s′))Prt←D[VALUE(t, s′) ≥ p(s′)] ≥ (p(s)− c(s′))Prt←D[VALUE(t, s′) ≥ p(s)]
By adding the inequalities and observing that by Lemma 7, for all price p, Prt←D[VALUE(t, s) ≥ p] =
Prt←D[VALUE(t, s′) ≥ p], we have
(p(s)− p(s) + c(s′)− c)Prt←D[VALUE(t, s) ≥ p(s)] ≥ (p(s′)− p(s′) + c(s′)− c)Prt←D[VALUE(t, s) ≥ p(s′)]
⇐⇒ (c(s′)− c)Prt←D[VALUE(t, s) ≥ p(s)] ≥ (c(s′)− c)Prt←D[VALUE(t, s) ≥ p(s′)]
⇐⇒ Prt←D[VALUE(t, s) ≥ p(s)] ≥ Prt←D[VALUE(t, s) ≥ p(s′)]
In the last step, if the profit is non-zero then p > c which implies c(s′) > c because c(s′) is a convex combination of p
and c. We conclude p(s) ≤ p(s′). Since p(s′) gives more profit than p(s), we must have PROFD(s′) ≥ αPROFD(s).
In addition, the fact the distribution of values is identical and we only sell with lower probability implies EXTD(s′) ≤
e−(p−c)(1−α)EXTD(s) which completes the proof.
Corollary 27. If policy s is optimal, then PROFD(s) = R.
Proof. Suppose PROFD(s) > R, then there is a sufficiently small ε > 0 such that s′ = INV(s, (1 − ε)) and
PROFD(s′) ≥ R by Lemma 12. Yet by Lemma 12 EXTD(s′) < EXTD(s) contradicting s was optimal.
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Notation For arbitrary distribution D, let
SUPP(D) := {x1, ..., xn}
then for i ∈ [|SUPP(Dv)|], j ∈ [|SUPP(Dk|], let tij := (vi, kj),
rij(s) := VALUE(tij , s)Prt←D[VALUE(t, s) ≥ VALUE(tij , s)]
In the discrete case, we have PROFD(s) := maxi,j rij(s). To compute rij(s), we must compute if for some i′ ∈
[|SUPP(Dv)|], j′ ∈ [|SUPP(Dk|], VALUE(tij , s) < VALUE(ti′j′ , s) or VALUE(tij , s) ≥ VALUE(ti′j′ , s).
Definition 8 (Type Total Order). We define a type total order <s where tij <s ti′j′ denote VALUE(tij , s) ≤
VALUE(ti′j′ , s). Observe that for all regulation s, fix indexes i and j, then for all i′ ≥ i, j′ ≥ j, tij <s ti′j ,
tij <s tij′ .
Before we proof Proposition 26, let’s get intuition why one might expect it to be true. Assume Dv and Dk have each
support of cardinality 2. When there is no regulation s0 = (0, 0), we have the total order of types
t11 <s0 t12 <s0 t21 <s0 t22
As we increase fines, for some y > 0 and policy s = (y, 0), we will have VALUE(t12, s) = VALUE(t21, s) since t12 is
more efficient than t21. However, assume at the highest possible fine, the seller prefers to sell to {t12, t21, t22}. When
fines are slightly smaller, the seller might prefer to sell only to t21, and t22 if v2 is sufficiently larger than v1. If that is
the case, selling at lower probability might be better to decrease externalities than increasing fines. If that is the case, the
optimal fine policy will give more profit than the profit constraint R, and by Corollary 27 such policy cannot be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 26. Define the value distribution Dv , and efficiency distribution Dk,
Dv =
{
v1 = 1 w. p. 12
v2 = 1.58 w. p. 12
Dk =
{
k1 = 3 w. p. 12
k2 = 9 w. p. 12
Consider fines of the form y(k) := e
k
k−1
ek .
Let the profit constraint be R = r12(1.2 · y(3), 0). We will have R ∈ (0.51, 0.52), but to compute R, we must first
compute the typs total order when fines are 1.2 · y(3), Claim 28. We will then show that setting externalities to y(3)
yields strictly lower externalities then setting fines to 1.2 ·y(3), Claim 31. Further we argue that when fines are 1.2 ·y(x),
Dv × {3} has optimal fine policy, Claim 32.
Claim 28. If s = (y, 0), y ≤ 1.2 · y(3) then t11 <s t12 <s t21 <s t22.
Proof. Clearly t11 <s t12 and t21 <s t22. It is sufficient to show for y = 1.2 · y(3), t12 <s t21 and the claim follows
for all fines smaller than 1.2 · y(3) because ∂2VALUE(t,s)∂y∂k ≥ 0. Observe,
VALUE(t21, s)− VALUE(t12, s) = 1.58− 1 + `(3, s)− `(9, s)
> 0.83 > 0
which completes the proof.
Let’s now proof when the fines are in the range [y(3), 1.2 · y(3)], the seller never sells with probability 1.
Claim 29. For y ∈ [y(3), 1.2 · y(3)], then
r21(y, 0) > r11(y, 0)
Proof. By Claim 28, if y ≤ 1.2 · y(3), then t11 <s t12 <s t21 <s t22. We can then compute the profit,
r21(y, 0)− r11(y, 0) = 1
2
(1.58− `(3, y))− 1 + `(3, y)
> −0.25 + 1
2
`(3, y)
≥ −0.25 + 1
2
`(3, y(3))
= 0
which completes the proof.
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Next, we claim if the fine is 1.2 · y(3), the seller prefers to sell to t12, t21, t22 with probability 34 and when the fine is
y(3), the seller sells only to t21 and t22.
Claim 30. r21(y(3), 0) > r12(y(3), 0) and r12(1.2 · y(3), 0) > r21(1.2 · y(3), 0)
Proof. For arbitrary y,
r21(y, 0)− r12(y, 0) = 1
2
(1.58− `(3, y))− 3
4
(1− `(9, y))
By computing the left hand side for y = y(3) and y = 1.2 · y(3), we have r21(y(3), 0) − r12(y(3), 0) > 0 and
r21(1.2 · y(3), 0)− r12(1.2 · y(3), 0) < 0.
Next, we show that having slightly lower fines yields lower externalities.
Claim 31.
EXTD(y(3), 0) < EXTD(1.2 · y(3), 0)
Proof. For all fines y, if the seller sells at price VALUE(t22, y, 0), the profit is at most 1/4 which is smaller than the
profit constraint R > 1/2 . We have shown that for y ∈ [y(3), 1.3 · y(3)] the seller will not prefers to sell to everyone;
therefore, the seller either sells to {t12, t21, t22} or to {t21, t22}. In particular, when y = y(3), the seller sells to t21 and
t22 only. The externalities are
ExtD(y(3), 0) =
1
4y(3)
(
1
3
+
1
9
)
< 0.203
When y = 1.2 · y(3), the seller sells to t12, t21, t22 and the externalities are
ExtD(1.2 · y(3), 0) = 1
4 · 1.2 · y(3)
(
1
3
+
2
9
)
> 0.21
Observe 1.2 · y(3) is the highest fine of any feasible fine policy by our profit constraint R = r12(1.2 · y(3), 0). This is
because r12(1.2 · y(3), 0) is the highest profit we can get under policy (1.2 · y(3), 0). For fines y strictly larger than
1.2 · y(3), VALUE(t, 1.2 · y(3), 0) strictly stochastic dominate VALUE(t, y, 0) implying the profit is strictly smaller than
R. By the same argument, policy (y(3), 0) gets profit > R, and by Corollary 27, there is a non-simple policy that yields
lower externalities than (y(3), 0) which implies a non-fine policy is optimal. We conclude by claiming the distribution
Dv × {3} with profit constraint R has optimal fine policy.
Claim 32. A fine policy is optimal on Dv × {3}, R.
Proof. Another way to state Lemma 3 is to observe that given a profit constraint R, if 1T−1 is the highest loss we
can have, then T is the threshold where for all Dv × {k}, k ≥ T , the optimal policy is a fine policy. Observe that
`(k, y(k), 0) = 1k−1 . This implies, if y(3) is feasible on (Dv × {3}, R) then a fine policy is optimal.
Let s = (y(3), 0) and suppose the seller sells at price 1.58− `(3, y(3), 0) having a sale with probability 12 and getting
profit 0.54. We have R < 0.52; therefore, the policy s is feasible. By definition of y(k), since (y(3), 0) is feasible,
the threshold T where fine policies are optimal is at least 3. We can conclude, with distribution Dv × {3} and profit
constraint R, we have an optimal fine policy with fine at least y(3).
this completes the proof of Proposition 26.
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